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CRIMES, WIDGETS, AND PLEA BARGAINING: AN ANALYSIS OF CHARGE
CONTENT, PLEAS, AND TRIALS
By Kyle Graham
This article considers how the composition and gravamen of a charged
crime can affect the parties’ willingness and ability to engage in plea bargaining.
Most of the prevailing descriptions of plea bargaining ignore or discount the
importance of charge content in plea negotiations; in fact, one leading
commentator has likened crimes to widgets insofar as plea bargaining is
concerned. In developing its counter-thesis, this article reviews seven years
(FY2003FY2009) of federal conviction data, focusing on those crimes that
produce the most, and fewest, trials, relative to how often they are alleged; the
most, and fewest, acquittals at trial; and the most, and fewest, plea bargains that
involve a substantial alteration in charges. Overall, the data demonstrate that the
character of, and circumstances that surround, a particular offense can catalyze
or frustrate plea bargaining. Similar information to that utilized in and gleaned
from this study, it is also argued, can and should be considered in connection with
the adoption of new crimes and the re-evaluation of existing offenses. This
information would provide legislatures with insight into how a proposed crime is
likely to be utilized, and how current crimes are being used.
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INTRODUCTION
More so than most crimes, felony tax evasion (26 U.S.C. § 72011) tends to
produce convictions when taken to trial. According to data compiled by the

―Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by
this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a
felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case
of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of
prosecution.‖ 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2006).
1

2
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Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AOUSC),2 less than 14 percent
of all tried counts that allege this crime result in not-guilty verdicts.3 This figure is
significantly lower than the ―normal‖ acquittal rate at trial across federal crimes.4
One would expect, then, that defendants charged with this offense would agree to
pretrial guilty pleas relatively often, with the hope that they would then receive
credit at sentencing for their early acceptance of responsibility.5 In fact, the
contrary is true―this charge is approximately three times more likely to be taken
to trial than the ―average‖ crime is.6
2

The data referenced in the text above derive from a series of datasets that each contain
information regarding federal criminal cases that terminated in a given fiscal year (October 1 to
September 30), which the author has compiled into a single database (hereinafter referred to as the
―AOUSC Database,‖ and which remains in the possession of the author). The datasets comprising
this database are as follows: United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Federal Justice Statistics Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District Court—
Terminated, 2003 [ICPSR 24153]; United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District
Court—Terminated, 2004 [ICPSR 24170]; United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District
Court—Terminated, 2005 [ICPSR 24187]; United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District
Court—Terminated, 2006 [ICPSR 24205]; United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District
Court—Terminated, 2007 [ICPSR 24222]; United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District
Court—Terminated, 2008 [ICPSR 29242]; and United States Department of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in
District Court—Terminated, 2009 [ICPSR 30784]).
3
AOUSC Database, supra note 2.
4
The overall acquittal rate, on a count-by-count basis, is approximately 21 percent. See
text accompanying notes 140–143, infra.
5
Pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a federal criminal defendant who ―clearly
demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense‖ is eligible for a two-level sentence
reduction. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2011). Furthermore, if a defendant
qualifies for this reduction, the base offense level associated with the offense is 16 or greater, and
the government files a motion ―stating that the defendant has assisted authorities in the
investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention
to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and
permitting the government and the court to allocate their resources efficiently,‖ the base offense
level will be decreased by one additional level. Id. ―[T]he timeliness of the defendant‘s conduct in
manifesting the acceptance of responsibility‖ is among the factors considered in determining
whether a defendant has clearly accepted this responsibility. Id. at cmt. n.1(H). A large percentage
of defendants who enter guilty pleas receive the benefit of this reduction. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 2010, tbl. 18 (2011), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2010/Table18.pdf
(reflecting that 94.9 percent of all defendants with reported conviction dispositions in fiscal year
2010 received the benefit of the two- or three-level acceptance of responsibility reduction); Ronald
F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 79, 131 (2005) (discussing comparable figures from earlier in the 2000s).
6
See text accompanying note 268, infra.
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At the other extreme, deprivation of civil rights under the color of law (18
U.S.C. § 2427) may be the most difficult crime for federal prosecutors to prove at
trial. Per AOUSC data, juries return not-guilty verdicts upon about half of all tried
counts that allege this offense.8 Does this high acquittal rate lead to a relatively
high number of trials? Or does it facilitate guilty pleas, with defendants‘
eagerness to place these matters before juries being more than offset by
prosecutorial willingness to cut a deal?9 Existing scholarship, which rarely
considers how courtroom actors deploy and respond to specific crimes, does not
answer these questions. As it turns out, 18 U.S.C. § 242 is one of the most
commonly tried crimes, relative to the number of cases in which it is alleged.10
The plea bargaining and trial practice that surrounds crimes such as tax
evasion and deprivation of civil rights suggest that an important consideration has
been overlooked in the ongoing conversation over why and how parties engage in
plea bargaining. To date, explanations of the plea-bargaining process have
focused upon (1) the thought processes and priorities of the relevant actors;11 (2)
institutional rules, policies and practices that constrain or encourage plea
7

This statute provides as follows:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth,
Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to
different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an
alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment
of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year,
or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this
section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a
dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts
committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an
attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated
sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned
for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.

18 U.S.C. § 242 (2006).
8
See text accompanying note 186, infra.
9
See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
50, 5961 (1968) (asserting that prosecutors have stronger incentives to engage in plea bargaining
when their cases are relatively weak); Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Plea
Bargaining, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 205, 220 (1999) (―A prosecutor who cared to produce a plea
would have to reduce charges significantly if the prosecutor had a weak evidentiary case.‖); Dean
J. Champion, Private Counsels and Public Defenders: A Look at Weak Cases, Prior Records, and
Leniency in Plea Bargaining, 17 J. CRIM. JUST. 253, 257 (1989). But cf. HARRY KALVEN, JR. &
HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 30–31 (surmising that the strongest cases are the most likely
to produce guilty pleas).
10
See text accompanying note 172, infra.
11
Ronald Wright has described this approach as being concerned with the ―micro-level
intentions‖ of the parties. Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal
Criminal Justice, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 79, 92 (2005).
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bargaining; or (3) the organization and structure of the criminal codes that provide
the backdrops for these bargains. The first approach either treats defendants, their
attorneys, and prosecutors as bargaining ―in the shadow of trial,‖12 or considers
how the circumstances of, and pressures upon, these actors may lead to bargains
that do not reflect likely trial outcomes.13 The second addresses matters such as
the discretion that judges are allowed to exercise at sentencing,14 the pressure to
negotiate that may be associated with high case volumes, 15 the policies that
particular prosecutorial authorities adopt with regard to plea bargaining,16 and
informal courtroom customs.17 The third concentrates upon the presence of
overlapping offenses within a criminal code, which may give a prosecutor more
tools with which to coerce plea bargains,18 and the ―space,‖ in terms of the
probable sentencing consequences, that exists between related crimes within a
code, which may affect the likelihood of a plea bargain to a given charge. 19
None of these approaches focuses upon the quiddities of particular crimes,
and the effect that these idiosyncrasies may have on the plea-bargaining process.20
12

This phrase originated in Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
13
E.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J.
1179, 1203–06, 1313 (1975) (discussing the incentives that may lead defense attorneys to
recommend guilty pleas that are not in their clients‘ interests); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining
Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004).
14
E.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING‘S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING
IN AMERICA 221–27 (2003) (discussing the effects that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have
had on plea bargaining).
15
E.g., Milton Heumann, A Note on Plea Bargaining and Case Pressure, 9 LAW & SOC‘Y
REV. 515, 516 (1975) (―Much of the informed thought and literature on plea bargaining assumes
(or at least conveys the impression) that plea bargaining can be best (though not necessarily
exclusively) understood as a function of case pressure.‖); Peter F. Nardulli, The Caseload
Controversy and the Study of Criminal Courts, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 89, 8990 (1979)
(discussing the perception that the pressures associated with large caseloads account for plea
bargaining); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2554–56 (2004) (discussing the importance of docket pressure in giving
prosecutors an incentive to plea bargain).
16
E.g., Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Screening / Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 29 (2002).
17
E.g., JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS 246–52 (1977) (discussing how stable courtroom workgroups
facilitate plea bargaining); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta
Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 129496 (1997).
18
E.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 529–33 (2001).
19
E.g., Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, Charge Movement and Theories of
Prosecutors, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 9 (2007); Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of
Depth and Distance in a Criminal Code on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C.
L. REV. 1935, 1940 (2006).
20
As far back as 1927, one the first academics to focus upon plea bargaining wrote that
existing surveys ―have not always given us sufficient detail as to the types of cases in which
compromises have been most frequent.‖ Justin Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 S.
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This gap, though significant, is also understandable. There may be several
hundred21 or even thousands22 of crimes in a single jurisdiction‘s criminal code,
and charging, plea-bargaining, and trial data for specific offenses can be difficult
to obtain and exploit.23 Difficult, but not impossible. The federal government, for
example, collects charge-level data for all criminal cases filed and terminated in
United States District Court. The amount of data involved is massive―the most
recent seven years of released information (which concern cases terminated in
federal district courts between October 2002 and September 2009) relates the
disposition of more than 1.2 million criminal counts―but, when harnessed, it
provides significant insight into the decision to engage in plea bargaining, or to
take a case to trial.
Above all else, review of this data reveals that substance matters. The
content of a charged offense―meaning its essential elements, the proof required
to establish the offense, and the basic gravamen of the crime―can make a
considerable difference in the frequency and composition of plea bargains.
Crimes vary in several respects material to plea bargaining, including, but not
limited to, the ease or difficulty associated with proving a charge at trial; the
volume of prosecutions for the offense; and whether the defense or prosecution is
likely to ascribe significant value to taking the charge to trial. The relationships
between these variables and the plea-bargaining practices that surround a
particular crime can be difficult to discern. This effort, however, ultimately leads
to a more accurate, if more complicated, understanding of plea-bargaining
practices than that produced by existing scholarship.
This finding presents a number of complications to the conventional,
rational-actor model of the plea bargaining process, which perceives plea
bargaining as a sort of market transaction. This model treats crimes with
comparable sentencing consequences as essentially fungible. Bringing the point
home, the jurist most closely associated with the market model, Judge Frank
Easterbrook, has analogized crimes to widgets.24 The actual utilization of offenses
such as 26 U.S.C. § 7201 and 18 U.S.C. § 242 establishes that, with apologies to
CAL. L. REV. 1, 12 (1927). Miller‘s article did go on to relate certain classes of crimes in which
plea bargaining was most frequent, however. See id. at 12–16 (identifying desertion, violations of
the liquor laws, automobile theft, seduction and statutory rape as among the crimes most likely to
be ―compromised‖).
21
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, supra note 18, at 514 (counting the
number of crimes recognized within Illinois, Virginia, and Massachusetts state law).
22
See JOHN BAKER, REVISITING THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIMES 1 (2008)
(estimating that there exist 4,450 federal crimes, as of 2007).
23
See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision not to
Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1715 (2010) (discussing the difficulties associated with
locating data on misdemeanor case processing).
24
Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289,
308 (1983).
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Judge Easterbrook, crimes are not widgets. Rather, the composition and gravamen
of a crime―not just the likely sentence that will adhere in a particular case―have
a significant bearing on plea bargaining, such that two crimes that involve roughly
similar custodial terms may produce quite different pleading practices and trial
rates.
To say that the characteristics of individual crimes may affect the pleabargaining process does not deny, but instead complements, other critical analyses
of the rational-actor model of plea bargaining. The substance of a particular
offense can exacerbate a defendant‘s or prosecutor‘s generic inability to perceive
a case in the manner predicted by the market model, or combine with code
structure to facilitate or frustrate plea bargaining. In other words, charge
substance affects not only the contours of the ―shadow of trial,‖ but also the
ability of the parties to perceive these likely outcomes and the extent to which this
information will cause them to choose plea bargains over trials. Ultimately, this
article builds a case against generalizations as to how plea bargaining applies to
all crimes, or across broad categories of crimes. To be accurate, descriptions of
plea-bargaining practices also must be quite specific. One must closely consider
the precise content and meaning of a charged offense, together with other material
influences, to obtain an accurate picture of the plea bargaining that surrounds that
crime.
To this point, the discussion has been mostly descriptive; yet this article
also contains a normative component. I argue that it is not only interesting, but
important, to consider how charge substance affects plea bargaining and trial rates
and outcomes. While bargaining practices are highly crime-specific, they are not
entirely incapable of prediction. If one can anticipate how the parties in as-yetunfiled criminal cases will utilize a crime that is under legislative consideration,
this knowledge may lead to a more thoughtful and well-developed assessment of
the proposed offense‘s value. For instance, if one can foresee that a new crime
will lead to a high number of trials, relative to how often it will be charged, the
costs of those trials can and should be incorporated into the legislature‘s decision
whether to enact the crime. Similarly, if a proposed crime resembles existing
offenses that are very frequently plea-bargained down to lesser crimes, this fact
also should become part of the legislative calculus. The data exist that would
allow us to initiate these conversations; it is time for them to occur.
The discussion below proceeds as follows. Part I provides a summary of
prevailing explanations regarding why, and how, parties and their agents engage
in plea bargaining. Part II then considers the various ways in which the content of
specific crimes may catalyze or chill plea bargaining. Next, Part III examines
seven years of data, which reflect the disposition of all criminal cases terminated
in federal district courts between October 2002 and September 2009. The charge7

level data from these cases reveal substantial variation in trial and plea-bargaining
rates across crimes. To shed light on these differences, Part IV more closely
considers the plea-bargaining and trial data for a few specific crimes, such as 26
U.S.C § 7201 and 18 U.S.C. § 242. Finally, Part V offers some concluding
thoughts about how the consideration of crime-specific data may improve the
evaluation of proposed and existing crimes.
I.

THE MARKET MODEL OF PLEA BARGAINING

Over the past quarter-century, much of the debate over plea bargaining has
revolved around whether, and to what extent, the plea-bargaining process can be
explained and justified by analogizing it to an everyday market transaction.
Today, the market analogy is most closely associated with Judge Frank
Easterbrook.25 In his 1983 article Criminal Procedure as a Market System,
Easterbrook argued that plea bargaining, together with other accoutrements of
criminal procedure, could ―be understood as elements of a well-functioning
market system‖ that ―set the ‗price‘ of crime‖26 and thereby tend to ―get the
maximum deterrent punch out of whatever resources are committed to crime
control.‖27
Per this view, plea bargaining tends to produce agreements that reflect
likely trial outcomes. Describing plea negotiations, Easterbrook asserted that a
―prosecutor will have a minimum settlement demand determined by the penalty
the prosecutor thinks he may obtain after trial and the cost of holding the trial
(less the cost of settling). [¶] As the sentence on conviction and the probability of
conviction rise, so does the prosecutor‘s minimum demand.‖ 28 A defendant,
meanwhile, comes to plea negotiations with her own settlement offer, dictated by
―the sentence she expects to receive if convicted,‖ adjusted for the likelihood of
conviction,29 together with the cost savings associated with settlement (as
opposed to taking the case to trial).30 These offers, both framed with likely trial
outcomes in mind, will yield a deal ―if the defendant‘s maximum offer equals or
25

Easterbrook was not the first commentator to analogize plea bargaining to a market
transaction, see, e.g., Richard P. Adelstein, The Negotiated Guilty Plea: A Framework for
Analysis, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 783, 809 (1978); Richard Uviller, Pleading Guilty: A Critique of
Four Models, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 102, 102–03 (1977), but he expanded upon existing
analysis.
26
Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 289.
27
Id. at 290.
28
Id. at 297.
29
Id. at 311–16. See also Adelstein, supra note 25, at 809 (observing that a ―defendant will
agree to a guilty plea if he perceives the cost of the sentence received upon the plea as less than the
expected disutility of the trial prospect and its associated sentence.‖).
30
Id. at 297.
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exceeds the prosecutor‘s minimum demand.‖31 To Easterbrook, these interactions,
repeated across cases, fulfill a ―price-establishing function at low cost,‖32 and are
therefore ―desirable, not just defensible, if the system attempts to maximize
deterrence from a given commitment of resources.‖33
This view of plea bargaining as a market in which the parties negotiate ―in
the shadow of trial‖ has cast a long shadow of its own.34 Contemporary
conversations about plea bargaining tend to either assume the basic truth of the
market model, or espy flaws in it.35 In this latter vein, Easterbrook observed that
his analysis proceeded on the assumption that defendants and prosecutors acted as
rational maximizers of their respective ―satisfactions.‖ 36 Much of the modern
debate over plea bargaining has considered what these ―satisfactions‖ are,37 and
whether the relevant actors are fully capable of appreciating and acting upon
them.38
Some of the most important literature in this genre has focused on the
inability of parties to behave in the manner predicted by the market model. In the
opinions of some commentators, information shortfalls, along with cognitive
biases and other ―psychological pitfalls,‖ may skew the plea-negotiation process
so as to place the bargained-for outcomes outside the shadow of likely trial
outcomes.39 Stephanos Bibas, in particular, has detailed how information deficits
and asymmetries,40 overconfidence,41 psychological blocks and denial
31

Id.
Id. at 309.
33
Id.
34
See Bibas, supra note 13, at 246465 (observing that the ―shadow-of-trial model . . .
looms large in recent plea-bargaining literature.‖); Russell Covey, Signaling and Plea
Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 66 WASH & LEE L. REV. 73, 77 (2009) (―Trial shadow theory
provides the dominant account of plea bargaining.‖); Harold W. Elder, Trials and Settlements in
the Criminal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Dispositions and Sentencing, 18 J. LEGAL STUD.
191, 199 (1989).
35
The many articles that start from a premise of a plea bargain ―market‖ include Russell
Covey, Longitudinal Guilt: Repeat Offenders, Plea Bargaining, and the Variable Standard of
Proof, 63 FLA. L. REV. 431, 436 (2011) (―Although criminal defendants-like shoppers-do not
always get the best bargain possible, plea bargaining-like shopping-can best be understood by
looking to the market that sets the relevant prices of the sought-for goods.‖)
36
Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 291.
37
Jeffrey Standen, An Economic Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, 2 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 249, 26167 (1998) (discussing the motives of the ―entrepreneurial prosecutor‖).
38
These subjects of study are not altogether novel. Decades ago, Albert Alschuler probed
the motives of prosecutors and defense attorneys who brokered plea deals. See Alschuler, The
Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, supra note 13, at 1203–06, 1313 (1975) (discussing
the incentives that may lead defense attorneys to recommend guilty pleas that are not in their
clients‘ interests); Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, supra note 9. Studies of
plea-bargaining practices in particular jurisdictions dating back to the 1920s likewise have
regarded the priorities of prosecutors, defense attorneys, and defendants as important determinant
of plea deals. E.g., Miller, supra note 20, at 1317.
39
Bibas, supra note 13, at 2496–2527.
40
Id. at 2493–96.
32
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mechanisms,42 the steep discounting of future incarceration by defendants,43 risk
aversion,44 and framing45 and anchoring effects46 may produce plea bargains that
do not reflect probable trial results, adjusted for the likelihood of conviction.47
Another line of inquiry focuses less on the motives of particular actors in
the plea-bargaining process than on how institutional environments affect parties‘
behavior.48 These analyses ascribe significant effects to matters such as local
policies regarding the appointment and payment of counsel,49 the government‘s
status as a monopsonist, being the sole producer and distributor of criminal
charges;50 mandatory sentencing provisions;51 the relevant prosecutorial
authority‘s stated policies52 and informal customs53 regarding charging and
bargaining; the inculcation of courtroom norms in new prosecutors and defense

41

Id. at 2498–2502. See also Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate,
69 CAL. L. REV. 652, 664 (1981) (―defendants have refused to plead guilty because of an
unrealistic optimism concerning the chances of beating the state‘s case‖).
42
Bibas, supra note 13, at 2502–04.
43
Id. a 2504–07.
44
Id. at 2507–12.
45
Id. at 2512–15.
46
Id. at 2515–19.
47
Others works that mine the same vein include Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion,
Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183, 192–203 (2007); and Robert E.
Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992).
48
For an overview of some of these inquiries into ―structural‖ determinants of plea
bargaining, see Kay L. Levine, The Intimacy Discount: Prosecutorial Discretion, Privacy, and
Equality in the Statutory Rape Caseload, 55 EMORY L.J. 692, 698–99 (2006).
49
Bibas, supra note 13, at 2476–82; Stephen Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101
YALE L.J. 1979, 1987–91 (1992).
50
E.g., Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV.
1471 (1993). According to Standen, as agents of a monopsonist, prosecutors can ―obtain
exchanges of pleas at subcompetitive prices‖ and ―have an incentive to discriminate against
particular defendants or subgroups of defendants by attempting to settle like cases differently
depending on defendants‘ personal characteristics unrelated to culpability.‖ Id. at 1473.
51
E.g., FISHER, supra note 14, at 22127; Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion:
The Trial Penalty and Plea Bargaining Reform, 50 CRIM. L. Q. 1, 18 (2005) (―Prosecutorial
dominance over plea bargaining became even more pronounced in the past three decades in the
United States with the introduction of mandatory sentencing.‖).
52
E.g., Leonard R. Mellon, Joan E. Jacoby & Marion A. Brewer, The Prosecutor
Constrained by His Environment: A New Look at Discretionary Justice in the United States, 72 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 52, 53 (1981) (summarizing findings of a study of ten large
prosecutors‘ offices, to the effect that ―in some cases the external environment imposes substantial
limits on a prosecutor‘s ability to act‖ and that prosecutorial policy ―significantly affects the socalled ‗discretionary‘ decisions made by the prosecutorial offices studied.‖); Ilene H. Nagel &
Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining
Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501 (1992); Welsh S.
White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 442
(1971) (discussing the Philadelphia district attorney‘s policies toward plea bargaining); Wright &
Miller, supra note 16 (describing how rigorous pre-filing screening of criminal cases by a local
prosecutor‘s office may reduce the rate of plea bargains within a jurisdiction).
53
E.g., LYNN M. MATHER, PLEA BARGAINING OR TRIAL? 84 (1979).
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attorneys;54 and the availability of bail and competent counsel.55 These critiques
do not gainsay the importance of individual actors in the plea-bargaining process.
They tend to stress, however, how forces outside of the immediate control of any
particular prosecutor, defense attorney, or defendant shape the motives and
priorities of these actors, and thereby affect the likelihood of plea bargaining and
the range of possible outcomes.
Within this latter sort of analysis lies a subject of study that merits special
mention, since it bears relation to the approach and thesis of this article. As
Ronald Wright and others have explained,56 code structure may affect the
likelihood of plea bargaining in a variety of ways. For one thing, a criminal code
may contain overlapping offenses conducive to ―charge stacking.‖ This practice
may facilitate plea bargaining by providing a defendant with a strong incentive to
engage in these negotiations (since ―stacked‖ charges threaten increased odds of
conviction, and enhanced punishment upon conviction57), and offering more
―landing points‖ for potential bargains (through withdrawal of one or more of the
―stacked‖ offenses).58 Likewise, a criminal code (or sentencing rules applicable to
the code) may facilitate plea bargaining by containing relatively ―smooth‖ and
―flat‖ sentencing slopes among related offenses, or chill this practice with
dramatic, inflexible sentencing ―cliffs‖―stark drop-offs in the sentencing
consequences attached to lesser offenses that might otherwise represent the basis
for plea bargains to more serious crimes.59 Toward this same general point, I have
54

E.g., MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCE OF PROSECUTORS,
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1978) (studying the adaptation process through which new
prosecutors and defense attorneys are assimilated into plea-bargaining practices); Terance D.
Miethe, Charging and Plea Bargaining Practices Under Determinate Sentencing: An
Investigation of the Hydraulic Displacement of Discretion, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155,
157, 174 (1987); Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 17, at 129496.
55
Bibas, supra note 13, at 2491–93.
56
Wright and Engen‘s study of portions of the North Carolina criminal code, The Effects of
Depth and Distance in a Criminal Code on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, supra
note 19, represents the most thorough assessment of code structure to date, and in its sensitivity to
the importance of specific code provisions in determining the likelihood of plea bargaining and the
content of these deals, comes the closest to capturing the spirit of this article.
57
WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 263 (2011); Stuntz,
The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, supra note 18, at 519–20.
58
See Russell Covey, Reconsidering the Relationship Between Cognitive Psychology and
Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 213, 229 (2007) (observing that ―prosecutors . . . can ‗stack‘
charges carrying mandatory minimums in order to threaten or impose dramatic increases in
mandatory sentences after a trial conviction.‖); Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law,
supra note 18, at 529–33 (2001).
59
Bibas, supra note 13, at 2486–91 (describing how sentencing laws often create ―slopes‖
and ―cliffs‖ between crimes, and the effects that these ―slopes‖ and ―cliffs‖ have on pleabargaining); Wright & Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a Criminal Code on
Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, supra note 19, at 195455 (discussing the
importance, in plea bargaining, of the sentencing ―distance‖ between the original charge and
viable plea-bargaining ―landing points‖ within a code).
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discussed elsewhere how codes may incorporate ―pleading crimes,‖ offenses that
encourage plea bargains by providing the basis for these deals.60
The common problem with these descriptions of plea bargaining is not
that they are wrong, but that they tend to be incomplete. The dynamics discussed
above are not constant across crimes. The utilization of some crimes may comport
neatly with the market model. Other offenses may exacerbate cognitive biases or
institutional quirks, and thereby produce a relatively high or low number of plea
bargains, or distinctively lenient or severe deals.
As matters stand, no one has comprehensively examined this missing
element of the plea-bargaining calculus.61 This lacuna reflects a deliberate choice
more than a mere oversight. Many observers regard the substance of an offense as
a relatively insignificant part of the plea-bargaining and sentencing calculus. In
the words of one commentator, when it comes to plea bargaining, specific crimes
―do not appear to matter very much any more, if they ever did. They have very
little to do with what is most important in a system of criminal justice, which is
how and how much justice is meted out to those convicted of crimes.‖62
Other commentators have considered the plea-bargaining practices that
surround a specific type of crime, or studied plea bargaining within a particular
jurisdiction or jurisdictions.63 These studies, however, tend to group crimes into
generic categories, from the relatively specific (e.g., ―rape,‖ ―burglary,‖ and
―theft‖64) to the more general (―drug crimes,‖ ―violent crimes,‖ etc. 65). These
labels may cloak significant variation among related offenses.66 A particular
60

Kyle Graham, Facilitating Crimes: An Inquiry into the Selective Invocation of Offenses
Within the Continuum of Criminal Procedures, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 665, 695702 (2011)
(hereinafter ―Facilitating Crimes‖).
61
Here again, it merits mention that the work of Ronald Wright and Rodney Engen
represents a step in the direction pursued by this article. In their work The Effects of Depth and
Distance in a Criminal Code on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, supra note 19,
Wright and Engen engage in a thoughtful review of how code structure affects the plea-bargaining
patterns associated with certain crimes within the North Carolina code.
62
Standen, An Economic Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, supra note 37, at
252.
63
E.g., Bowers, supra note 23, at 1711–12; Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet
Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the
District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV. 477 (2002); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal
Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2563–64 (2004) (generalizing and
juxtaposing the plea-bargaining practices believed to surround ―violent crimes‖ on the one hand
and ―drug crimes‖ on the other).
64
E.g., THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE
URBAN COUNTIES, 2006 11 (2010) (relating adjudication outcomes for various types of felony
defendants).
65
E.g., Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, supra note 63,
at 2563–64.
66
To similar effect, in discussing case outcomes across the federal criminal ―code,‖ the
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics groups related crimes into one of approximately 100
generic offense types. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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―violent‖ crime may lead to a high percentage of plea bargains while another
―violent‖ crime yields relatively few. Furthermore, by lumping specific crimes
into generic offense categories, these studies blunt their prescriptive potency.
Legislatures create, amend, and abolish individual crimes, not broad crime
categories. Likewise, prosecutors charge, and defense attorneys parry, specific
crimes that carry specific consequences.67 To lay a foundation for possible
reform, one must delve into the granular provisions of a code, and charge-level
behavior by courtroom actors. The discussion below takes up this task.
II.

CRIME CHARACTERISTICS AND PLEA BARGAINING

Crimes differ from one another in their gravamen, in their consequences
upon conviction (or, from the prosecutor‘s standpoint, upon acquittal), and in
many other respects. Only some of these differences have a substantial effect
upon a crime‘s conduciveness to plea bargaining.
One way to grasp the significance of charge content upon plea bargaining
begins with an oversimplified sketch of the rational-actor model of plea
bargaining. If one assumes that (1) both sides have perfect information as to the
likelihood of acquittal at trial, (2) the custody time that the defendant will receive
represents the exclusive concern of both the prosecution and defense (with the
prosecution intent upon maximizing this figure, and the defense seeking to
minimize it), and (3) infinite plea-bargaining options that allow the parties to
agree upon any and all possible custodial terms, very few cases should go to trial.
The characteristics of many crimes, however, throw sand into the gears of this
model. With some offenses, there may be little available information regarding
trial outcomes, taking a case to trial may have significant intrinsic value, and pleabargaining options may be relatively limited, or unattractive, compared to those
that appear with other crimes.68
STATISTICS ONLINE, tbl. 5.24.2010, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5242010.pdf. Since
each of these categories subsumes several specific crimes, the reported data regarding the sorts of
criminal cases that are prosecuted in federal court says very little about the utilization of individual
offenses.
67
Wright & Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a Criminal Code on Charging,
Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, supra note 19, at 1953 (―Prosecutors and defense attorneys
negotiate about guilty pleas for particular crimes, not just generic classes of felonies.‖).
68
The discussion above does not necessarily exhaust the ways in crimes may vary in a
manner relevant to plea bargaining and trial rates and outcomes. For example, though some crimes
may cleave relatively evenly across race, wealth, gender, occupation, and other pertinent
demographic facts, others do not. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
STATISTICS,
tbl.
5.39.2010,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5392010.pdf (relating that African-Americans accounted
for 78.5 percent of defendants sentenced for federal crimes involving crack cocaine in fiscal year
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A. Incomplete or Imperfect Information
First, crimes vary in the extent to which parties will possess accurate
information regarding trial outcomes. When the parties lack this information, they
may be unable to ascertain the contours of the shadow of trial, or disagree as to
what the probable outcome at trial will be. Either way, the result will be more
trials.69 As related below, these disagreements are more likely to arise with
difficult-to-prove crimes, and crimes that are not alleged with substantial
frequency.
1. Ease or Difficulty of Proof
Some crimes are easier to prove than others are.70 All else being equal, the
more difficult a crime is to prove, the greater the incentive the prosecution will
2010, as compared to only 26.8 percent of defendants sentenced for federal crimes involving
powder cocaine, and 7.6 percent of defendants sentenced for federal crimes involving marijuana).
These differences can affect plea bargaining and trial outcomes in a variety of ways. As will be
discussed, some crimes may implicate defendants as to whom juries are relatively prone to
exercise their nullification authority. Less advantageously for the defense, some crimes may
implicate classes who suffer from some pre-existing stigma, or as to whom the charge itself
stigmatizes notwithstanding the presumption of innocence. Either way, this dynamic may enhance
the odds of conviction and strengthen the prosecution‘s hand in plea bargaining. Meanwhile, some
crimes, such as insider-trading offenses, tend to involve well-heeled defendants with significant
resources to fight the charges alleged against them, and who may be in a position to negotiate
more advantageous pleas. See EISTENSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 17, at 234–35 and 241–42
(discussing the perception that affluent defendants are more likely to mount vigorous defenses,
and relating data that suggest that defendant characteristics have a modest to moderate effect on
case dispositions); Bowers, supra note 23, at 1711–12 (describing these issues as they pertain to
potential prosecutions for obscenity and white-collar crimes). At the other extreme, some crimes
tend to involve defendants who, due to language barriers, a lack of education, or otherwise, may
be incapable of robust participation in the strategic planning and assessment their cases. This
disability may lead to the abdication of plea-bargaining authority to defense attorneys, who may
not always be acting in their principals‘ best interests. Bibas, supra note 13, at 2476.
69
MATHER, supra note 53, at 143 (finding, based on a study of California plea-bargaining
practices, that ―Disagreement between defense and prosecuting attorney over the basic question of
legal guilt was [an] important factor leading to adversary trial.‖); Elder, supra note 34, at 196
(―One conclusion of economic models of the courts is that the more agreement there is in the
estimates by both sides of the likely outcome of a trial, the lower the probability of a trial‖) and
199 (concluding, based on a regression analysis, that ―[f]actors increasing agreement between
defendant and prosecution increase the probability of settlement.‖) See also George L. Priest &
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1217 (1984)
(observing that civil cases will tend to settle when the applicable law, and likely result at trial, are
clear to the parties).
70
EISTENSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 17, at 235 (―While every offense must be proved
‗beyond a reasonable doubt,‘ the statutory provisions of the criminal code require varying kinds of
evidence that make some crimes easier to prove than others.‖); Stuntz, The Pathological Politics
of Criminal Law, supra note 18, at 550–51 (discussing the relative ease and difficulty associated
with proving different crimes). Crimes that have been identified, by one source or another, as
particularly difficult to prove at trial include ―complex financial cases,‖ Jean Eaglesham,
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have to engage in plea bargaining (as opposed to insisting on a guilty plea to the
charged offense),71 and the less motivation the defense will have to plead guilty to
the charged crime, at least without a significant sentence discount.72 Given these
incentives, one might surmise that crimes that are more difficult to prove at trial
will tend to produce more plea bargains, as opposed to ―straight‖ pleas to the
charged offense without any promised reduction in sentence terms. Less
obviously, these offenses also may produce a relatively large share of trials, as
opposed to pleas, since the uncertainty of the outcome at trial may lead to
divergent settlement demands.
As background, it bears re-emphasis that some crimes implicate proof that
brooks little dispute, while other offenses tend to involve evidence that is much
more conducive to conflicting interpretations. For an example of a crime that
implicates straightforward proof, consider 8 U.S.C. § 1326, which criminalizes
the re-entry of a deported person into the United States.73 In a mine-run case, this
crime simply requires that the prosecution establish that the defendant alien (1)
had been deported from the United States; (2) was later found in the United
States; and (3) intended to re-enter the United States.74 The first element is
typically established by an order of deportation; the latter two, by testimony to the
effect that the defendant was found in the United States. This evidence tends to
permit little debate as to the defendant‘s intent, or any other element of the
Financial Crimes Bedevil Prosecutors, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 6, 2011, at C1
(describing these crimes as ―especially hard to prove‖); vehicular manslaughter, Vivian Huang,
Few Found Guilty in Car Deaths, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 19, 1995, at Suburban1, and rape,
William Mitchell, We’re Only Fooling Ourselves: A Critical Analysis of the Biases Inherent in the
Legal System’s Treatment of Rape Victims, 18 BUFF. J. GENDER, L., & SOC. POL‘Y, 73, 76 (2009–
10), just to name a few.
71
See, e.g., DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR
INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 55 (1966) (―Confronted with cases involving crimes like adultery or
situations where a victim is more disreputable than the defendant, the prosecutor, doubtful of jury
reaction, will often reduce the charge to a point where the defendant will plead guilty.‖); White,
supra note 52, at 445 (observing that, in Philadelphia, ―likelihood of conviction is generally very
important in determining what concessions will be offered to induce a plea. While some trial
prosecutors enjoy the challenge of a difficult case, most will offer substantial concessions rather
than risk losing a jury trial.‖) and 448 (discussing the same pattern, among New York City district
attorneys).
72
See Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargaining, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2313
(2006) (―A defendant who knows that the probability of acquittal at trial is substantial will only
agree to plead guilty in return for an exceedingly lenient bargain. In stronger cases, the prosecutor
will not offer exceedingly lenient bargains, knowing that the defendant will settle for much less.‖);
Mellon, Jacoby & Brewer, supra note 52, at 78 (observing that ―a disposition by a plea is more
likely to occur as the evidentiary strength of the case is reduced‖).
73
With limited exceptions, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 makes it a federal crime for someone who ―has
been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has departed the United States while an
order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding,‖ to thereafter enter, attempt to enter, or
be at any time found in, the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006).
74
United States v. Carlos-Colmenares, 253 F.3d 276, 277–78 (7th Cir. 2001).
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crime.75 The prosecution has little incentive, other than avoiding the hassle of
trial, to bargain in these cases.76
At the other pole, some crimes may be difficult to prove because the
evidence commonly relied upon to establish guilt is ambiguous, or subject to
impeachment.77 For example, it is sometimes said that crimes that require
fraudulent or specific intent are difficult for prosecutors to establish.78 Perjury, in
particular, is oftentimes described as difficult to prove. 79 But not all variants of
perjury are equally situated in this respect. Perjury in connection with one‘s tax
returns may be relatively easy to show, since we assume that most people know
roughly how much money they make.80 Trial perjury may be more difficult to
establish. This difficulty derives not just from the intent element associated with
this crime, but because the circumstances that tend to surround this type of perjury
may make it much more difficult to rule out alternative explanations for the false
statements at issue, such as simple forgetfulness.
In addition to problems of proof, juries may balk at returning a conviction
for a crime if they feel that the law is wrong-headed, or have special sympathy for
a defendant.81 Jury nullification is a longstanding practice: In the 1850s northern
75

Judge Richard Posner has hypothesized the case of a previously deported person
involuntarily transported into the United States by a hijacker, id. at 278, but this fact pattern seems
rather unlikely to occur very often. But cf. Testimony of Steven F. Hubachek and Shereen J.
Charlick, Supervisory Attorneys of Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., before the United States
Sentencing Commission Concerning Fast Track or Early Disposition Programs at 5 (Sept. 23,
2003), at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/
20030923/hubachek.pdf (stating that section 1326 cases sometimes involve ―difficult legal
issues‖).
76
See Wright & Engen, supra note 19, at 1967 (speculating that with some easy-to-prove
crimes, charge bargaining may be unavailable as an option because defendants ―have little value to
offer in exchange for a reduced charge‖).
77
It also has been suggested that certain types of crimes tend to be more challenging for
prosecutors because they tend to involve affluent defendants capable of hiring capable counsel, or
tend to implicate thorny constitutional issues. See Bowers, supra note 23, at 1711–12 (describing
these concerns as they pertain to potential prosecutions for obscenity and white-collar crimes).
78
See, e.g., United States v. Lockhart, 167 Fed. Appx. 111 at *1 (11th Cir. 2006) (observing
that it can be difficult to prove fraudulent intent); United States v. Bradfield, 225 F.3d 660 at *9
(6th Cir. 2000) (―Specific intent is . . . the most difficult state of mind for a prosecutor to prove‖);
Lisa M. Fairfax, Form Over Substance? Officer Certification and the Promise of Enhanced
Personal Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 5253 (2002)
(discussing the difficulties associated with establishing criminal intent in financial fraud cases).
79
See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 67 M.J. 611, 615 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2009) (―perjury
is a notoriously difficult charge to prove‖); Bob Egelko, Perjury Always a Tough Charge to Prove
in Court, S.F. CHRONICLE, April 15, 2006, at 1; Ken Armstrong, Hard to Prove, Perjury Often
Goes Unpunished, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, September 25, 1998, at A1.
80
See United States v. Boulerice, 325 F.3d 75, 80 (1st Cir. 2003) (observing that
circumstantial evidence can suffice to establish the ―willfulness‖ intent requirement in a
prosecution under 26 U.S.C. § 7203(1), which criminalizes the willful and knowing utterance of
material false statements on a tax return).
81
See Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 877, 887–903
(1999) (describing a variety of situations in which juries may exercise their nullification power).
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juries refused to return guilty verdicts in cases brought under the Fugitive Slave
Act;82 Prohibition-era juries declined to convict defendants who committed
liquor-law violations;83 and modern juries may be ―balking in trials in which a
conviction could trigger a ‗three strikes‘ or other mandatory sentence, and in
‗assisted suicide,‘ drug possession, and firearms cases.‖84 As these examples
suggest, the concerns that encourage nullification do not cleave evenly across
crimes.85
One might think that prosecutors would account for these difficulties in
case selection. And to an extent, they do.86 But there may exist political or other
pressures to file certain types of cases even when prosecutors anticipate a
relatively high likelihood of acquittal. Or a prosecutor may personally be
convinced that the charges are just and well-founded, even if she anticipates that a
jury may disagree.87 Furthermore, prosecutors may be unable to reliably predict
how jurors will assess some types of cases. This lack of visibility may be acute
with crimes where the outcome often hinges on a jury‘s visceral response to the
witnesses at trial, which may be difficult for the prosecutor to anticipate. In these
cases, a prosecutor may be unable to avoid a high acquittal rate, if he or she is to
file any charges at all.
The market model accounts for variation in ―provability,‖ insofar as it
acknowledges that the likelihood of conviction at trial will affect the content of a
plea bargain.88 Per the model, as the odds of acquittal increase, so too does the
sentencing ―discount‖ that the defendant will demand, and receive.89 The model
says little about any connection between provability and the frequency of pretrial
pleas, however. Given the assumptions incorporated into the model, difficult-to82

Id. at 892–93. See also Nancy King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury
Room and Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 461 (1998) (discussing the steps taken
to avert nullification).
83
Marder, supra note 81, at 894–95.
84
King, supra note 82, at 433.
85
Furthermore, there exist some crimes where the jury, though not prone to outright
nullification, may be inclined to give the defendant the benefit of every doubt, reasonable or no.
See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 9, at 286–97 (discussing several ―unpopular‖ crimes, as to
which juries are relatively prone to acquit).
86
See text accompanying note 224, infra.
87
For such a case, consider the trial, and retrial, of Byron de la Beckwith, accused (and,
decades later, convicted) of the murder of civil rights activist Medgar Evers. The prosecutor,
William Waller, retried the case even after the first trial resulted in a hung jury. See Second
Beckwith Trial Begins Tomorrow, DELTA DEMOCRAT (Greenville, MS), April 5, 1964, at 1. Even
in the initial trial, ―a quick acquittal had been freely predicted,‖ given the place, time and
composition of the jury. Mistrial Stuns Confident Byron, THE LEADER-CALL (Laurel, MS), Feb. 8,
1964, at 1. Likewise, federal prosecutors who brought civil-rights charges against public officials
back in the 1960s and 1970s had such a dismal conviction rate that they must have foreseen a high
likelihood of acquittal in many cases that they filed, and tried. See text accompanying note 223,
infra.
88
Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 313.
89
Id. at 312.
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prove crimes should result in just as high a percentage of pleas as easily proved
crimes do; only the terms will change.
Of course, these assumptions are never satisfied; that is the key lesson
taught by the works of Bibas, Wright, and others. Given realistic conditions, the
leading authorities seem to disagree about whether easy or hard cases are more
susceptible to pleas, and plea bargaining. In their seminal work The American
Jury, Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel surmised that the ―strongest‖ cases, from
the prosecutor‘s perspective, would tend to produce guilty pleas, leaving
relatively weak cases for trial.90 More recently, Bibas has suggested that the
opposite may be true, at least in certain types of cases. Prosecutors suffer from
loss aversion, too, he observes; this being the case, prosecutors may be more
inclined to bargain in weaker cases, leading to more pleas in these matters. 91
It is possible that both views are correct. Here, it is important to
distinguish between pleas and plea bargaining. In some especially strong cases,
the defendant may simply ―plead to the sheet,‖ even without any promises of
leniency from the prosecution. This amounts to capitulation, not bargaining, and
normally bespeaks a compelling prosecution case. Insofar as true bargaining is
concerned, Kalven and Zeisel may have identified a consequence of imperfect
information. If parties cannot predict likely trial outcomes, as a crime becomes
harder to prove it may create more room for disagreement between the parties as
to the probable result at trial―leading to fewer plea bargains (since the parties
may not agree on the terms of a ―fair‖ bargain), and more trials.
At the same time, Bibas also may have a point. While difficult-to-prove
crimes may produce more trials, on average, than their more straightforward
counterparts do, as to any particular crime this influence may be more than
counterbalanced by other factors. Prosecutors may take certain types of
challenging but high-profile cases to trial relatively often, to showcase their
office‘s commitment to pursuing the charged offenses.92 Likewise, some hard-toprove crimes may claim particularly attractive ―landing points‖ for plea
bargains;93 or the prosecution and defense may be capable of pinpointing and
agreeing upon the relatively high odds of acquittal for some charges. In other
words, consideration of a crime‘s conduciveness to proof is necessary, but
insufficient, to ascertain the likelihood of a plea or trial, and the relative leniency
or harshness of likely plea terms.

90
91
92
93

KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 9, at 30.
Bibas, supra note 13, at 2472–73.
See text accompanying notes 105–109, infra.
See text accompanying notes 126–129, infra.
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2. Case Volumes
A large body of resolved matters that allege a particular crime may
increase the frequency of future plea bargains and narrow the range of outcomes
in these cases for two reasons. First, a high volume of cases may produce more
robust and readily available information regarding the likelihood of conviction at
trial, the ―going rate‖ for a plea bargain, or both. Second, frequent prosecution
may lead to the development of specialist practitioners with enhanced caseassessment capabilities.
As to the first of these consequences, it may take time, and many
prosecutions, to appreciate how simple or difficult it is to convict a defendant of a
particular crime.94 Practitioners know that it is easy to convict a defendant of a
garden-variety 8 U.S.C. § 1326 charge. This knowledge represents the
accumulation of many years‘ worth of prosecutions. Many other crimes claim no
equivalent body of work. While there exist, by one estimate, 4,450 federal
crimes,95 in a given year only around 1,500 offenses are actually alleged in federal
prosecutions.96 Moreover, most of these cases tend to implicate the same handful
of charges. In one recent fiscal year (2009), fewer than 20 crimes accounted for
more than half of all federal counts filed, and fewer than 300 crimes accounted for
95 percent of all such counts.97 Many crimes thus have no opportunity to develop
a reputation as easy or difficult to prove. With these rarely charged crimes, parties
and their attorneys must speculate as to the ―shadow of trial,‖ rather than having
past results (or the customary terms of plea deals) upon which to base their
bargains. These predictions may vary, leading to more trials and fewer plea
bargains.98
In a similar spirit, more prosecutions for an offense within a particular
jurisdiction may produce enhanced case-assessment skills among prosecutors and
defense attorneys. These skills may produce more plea bargains for that crime,

94

A similar dynamic applies to attorneys, as well as crimes; it takes time for a defense
attorney or prosecutor to develop a ―feel for a case,‖ so as to know whether to plea-bargain the
case, or take it to trial. See HEUMANN, supra note 54, at 76, 10203.
95
BAKER, supra note 22, at 1.
96
Kyle Graham, Sandusky’s Law, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Dec. 5, 2011, 1:38 p.m.),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/12/sandusky%E2%80%99s-law.html
(reviewing data culled from Executive Office of the United States Attorneys charging files).
Notwithstanding the juxtaposition of the 4,450 and 1,500 figures above, one must resist the
temptation to compare the two figures; counting crimes is a highly subjective task, and different
methodologies may lead to quite different totals.
97
Id.
98
See McCoy, supra note 51, at 8 (―Furthermore, with rarely alleged crimes, the viability of
various defenses may unclear. A defendant may be reluctant to enter a plea, for fear that doing so
will forfeit her ability to raise the defense on appeal.‖).
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since the attorneys will be better able to ascertain likely trial outcomes. 99 In this
respect, there also may exist a more subtle and non-linear effect of case volume
upon plea bargaining. A prosecutor who rarely, if ever, charges a particular crime
may not appreciate how difficult it will be to prosecute that offense; a defense
attorney rarely tasked with the opposite responsibility may find herself equally at
a loss. While these uncertainties might cancel each other out, they also may leave
the parties susceptible to cognitive biases that tend to deter or skew pleabargaining.
These dynamics change as the number of cases that involve an offense
increase. At a slightly higher volume of cases, prosecutorial capabilities may tend
to exceed defense skills, since these cases will be spread out among defense
attorneys and concentrated within a single prosecuting entity (which may assign a
particular prosecutor, or group of prosecutors to specialize in these cases). This
imbalance may lead to plea bargains with terms more favorable to the prosecution
than in cases that allege either ―low-volume‖ crimes or ―high-volume‖ crimes. As
to the latter, when a crime is charged often enough, a specialized defense bar may
develop (or generalist defense attorneys may cultivate sufficient skill) to
effectively counter the prosecution, leading to more defense-friendly bargains.
B. Trial Costs and Value
Another dimension along which crimes vary in a manner material to plea
bargaining concerns the relative costs and value of trial, as it pertains to a
particular offense. Just as low case volumes and high acquittal rates may cause
parties to disagree as to likely trial outcomes, in some cases, trial may be the only
way for a party to stand on principle (from the defense‘s perspective), or to reap
the sentencing or publicity benefits believed to accrue only from trial (from the
prosecution‘s point of view). At the same time, the trial of different crimes will
impose different costs on the parties. As these costs increase, so too will their
interest in resolving the case by way of a plea that will allow them to avoid these
losses.
First, crimes vary in how costly they are to defend. A defendant may
choose to enter a plea to a crime simply to avoid the costs of trial, even when the
plea carries almost the same punishment as a conviction following trial would.100
These out-of-pocket cost considerations may predominate in cases that threaten
relatively little punishment. Depending upon a defendant‘s circumstances, many
See HEUMANN, supra note 54, at 76, 10203 (discussing the development of a ―going
rate‖); Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 310 (―The specialized bar or office also is able to obtain and
use, at low cost, information about ‗the going rate‘ for particular offenses.‖).
100
See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 95255 (1983); Bowers,
supra note 23, at 1708–09.
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may think it better simply to plead guilty to a misdemeanor offense than to incur
these ―guaranteed‖ costs of trial, which will be expended regardless of whether
the defendant is convicted or acquitted.
Also, especially with some particularly stigmatic misdemeanors,
defendants may prefer relatively quiet pretrial pleas to the exposure of a public
trial. ―Morals‖ crimes such as solicitation of a prostitute, public intoxication, or
indecent exposure fall within this sphere of crimes as to which the ―costs‖ of trial,
capable of avoidance through a pretrial plea, often involve more than merely
financial expenditures.101 At the other extreme, some defendants may assign
substantial positive value to taking their cases to trial. A trial may be the only way
that a defendant can gain a public hearing on his asserted defense, or showcase
what he believes is an unjust law, or an improper application of that law. In these
cases, the publicity benefits and expressive impact of trial cannot be captured by
plea bargaining.
Trials impose costs on the prosecution, as well. As with the defense, the
―expense‖ of trying a case consists of both the opportunity cost of the
prosecutor‘s time and the actual financial cost of trying a case.102 Compare, for
example, two hypothetical misdemeanor cases that carry similar prospective
punishments. The first involves a simple battery; the second, a driving under the
influence charge. Absent unusual facts, the first case is unlikely to be particularly
expensive or time-consuming to try. The DUI case, on the other hand, may be
significantly more costly. Most notably, modern DUI trials typically require
expert testimony. 103 These additional witnesses not only drive up the financial
cost of trying a case from the state‘s perspective; they also make the case longer,
and thus more demanding of the prosecutor‘s finite time. Presumably, this
additional ―cost‖ increases the prosecutor‘s incentive to negotiate a deal. 104
Prosecutors may reject plea bargaining, meanwhile, in certain types of
cases where any compromise would concede too much. This issue tends to arise
when the prosecutor seeks the maximum possible punishment for a criminal act or
See, e.g., Steve Kornacki, Larry Craig’s Plea: Rationality, not ‘Panic,’ N.Y. OBSERVER,
(Aug. 31, 2007, 4:37 p.m.), http://www.observer.com/2007/larry-craigs-plea-rationality-not-panic
(observing that by entering a plea to morals offenses, former United States Senator Larry Craig
kept ―his secret safe for more than two months. Had he lawyered up and fought the charges, we
would have known instantly.‖).
102
See Standen, An Economic Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, supra note 37,
at 259 (―In the disposition of [a] case by plea . . . punishment resources are exchanged for
prosecutorial resources, as the prosecutor trades a selected term of imprisonment . . . for a savings
in expenditures of his resources.‖).
103
Michael M. Brewer, Tactically Developing Your Case, ASPATORE 2 (2008) (―DUI cases
almost always involve the use of expert scientific testimony by a government criminalist.‖).
104
See Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 297 (describing the difference between trial costs and
settlement costs as bearing upon the prosecution‘s incentive to agree to a plea deal, as opposed to
taking a case to trial).
101
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acts, or where the prosecutor insists upon a conviction to a particular crime,
instead of a substitute offense.105 As an example of the former situation, when the
prosecution insists upon the death penalty, trial is virtually assured. 106 With the
latter scenario, prosecutors may want to highlight their dedication to strict
enforcement of a particular law, or type of laws. 107 Rejecting any plea bargains
and taking these cases to trial unless the defendant ―pleads to the sheet‖ represents
a very visible means of displaying this commitment. Not infrequently, these
interests coincide, particularly when violent crimes are involved. It is not by
accident that murder cases tend to produce more trials (and acquittals) than most
other crimes,108 that bans or limits on plea bargaining announced by local
prosecutors tend to curtail bargaining only as to serious or violent crimes; 109 or
that prior surveys of plea bargaining and trial rates have observed that violent
crimes tend to produce more trials than non-violent crimes do.110

105

See Sudnow, supra note 127, at 274 (describing certain types of criminal cases, including
―murders, embezzlements, multiple rape cases . . . large scale robberies, [and] dope ring
operations‖ that ―arouse public attention and receive special notice in the papers‖ and as to which
―even were a guilty plea available, both parties feel uncomfortably obliged to bring issues of moral
character in the courtroom.‖).
106
See Samuel R. Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 125, 145 (1998) (―In many capital cases . . . there is no plea bargaining.‖).
107
See Covey, supra note 58, at 230 (noting that in ―high-visibility‖ cases, ―prosecutors (and
judges) are less likely to negotiate unduly lenient deals.‖); Bibas, supra note 13, at 2472
(observing that ambitious prosecutors ―may push strong or high-profile cases to trial to gain
reputation and marketable experience‖).
108
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, tbl.
5.34.2010 (May 28, 2011), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5342010.pdf (relating that in
more than 30 percent of federal murder cases with sentences issued under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines in fiscal year 2010, the conviction was gained by way of trial―a figure far higher than
that accompanying any other category of offense); COHEN & KYCKELHAHN, supra note 64, at 11,
16 (showing a significantly higher percentage of murder, voluntary manslaughter, and voluntary
homicide cases being resolved through trial in surveyed large urban counties than any other felony
offense); Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, supra note 63, at
2563 (―In murder cases, prosecutors generally pursue every case they can, which is why the
acquittal rate in such cases is so much higher than for felonies generally. Cases cannot be dropped
out of fear that the defendants might win at trial; voters may forgive an acquittal, but they surely
won't forgive blowing off a homicide.‖).
109
For examples of prosecutors who have announced no-plea-bargaining policies as to
violent crimes, see Leslie Reed, County Attorney: No More Plea Deals, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
Jan. 3, 2009, at 1A; Rob Johnson, No Deals for Violent Crimes, D.A. Says, THE COMMERCIAL
APPEAL (Memphis, TN), Dec. 20, 1996, at Al; Pam Belluck, Queens Prosecutor Bans Plea
Bargaining in Felony Cases, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1996, at B3; Ian Fisher, Bronx District
Attorney Moves to Ban Plea Bargains in Felony Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1992 at B3; Jean
Davidson, Prosecutors Limit Plea Bargaining, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 16, 1982, at NW2.
110
MATHER, supra note 53, at 142 (finding, upon a study of California plea-bargaining
practices, that ―The most important factor leading to a full court or jury trial was disagreement
between defense and prosecution over the sentence in cases where severe punishment was
likely.‖); Elder, supra note 34, at 199 (concluding from an empirical study that ―factors increasing
the stakes [of a criminal case] reduce the probability of settlement‖); Mellon, Jacoby & Brewer,
supra note 52, at 77 (finding that the most serious, high-priority cases ―generally go[] to trial‖).
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The expressive importance of obtaining a conviction for a particular
offense also underscores how a prosecutor may not be exclusively concerned with
the maximization of punishment in a particular case.111 Assume, for example, that
the defense in a high-profile and strong insider trading case in which the
maximum possible sentence consists of two years in prison were to approach the
prosecution with a settlement offer: the defendant will agree to serve the full twoyear term, but on the condition that she plead guilty to only a (factually supported,
but as yet uncharged) count of misprision of a felony, 112 to be alleged in a
superseding indictment to be filed. I do not believe that all, or even most,
prosecutors would accept this proposal, even though it removes any uncertainty
associated with trial and would grant the prosecution the full quantum of custody
it could obtain after trial on the charged offense. If this suspicion is correct, the
reason must lie in the fact that with some crimes, prosecutors care first and
foremost about obtaining a conviction for the charged offense. No plea deal to a
different crime, regardless of its custody terms, will capture the same gains for the
prosecution.
C. Limited and Expansive Options
Finally, crimes also differ in the number and relative attractiveness of
plausible plea-bargaining options that apply to the offense.
As previously discussed, as the odds of conviction decrease, the
prosecutor presumably will become more willing to reduce her punishment
demand. There are two ways that such a reduction may occur: the charge itself
may permit negotiations over sentence length upon conviction, or the case may
involve multiple charges, such that the parties can arrive upon more lenient
punishment terms simply by agreeing that one or more charges will be dismissed
in return for a defense plea. Yet crimes are not equally situated insofar as either
―sentence bargaining‖ or ―charge bargaining‖ are concerned.113 With some
111

Cf. RICHARD T. BOYLAN & CHERYL K. LONG, SIZE, MONITORING AND PLEA RATE; AN
EXAMINATION OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS 17 (2000) (assuming that, in negotiating plea
agreements, prosecutors seek to maximize the amount of time that defendants spend in custody);
Standen, An Economic Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, supra note 37, at 259
(observing that ―[t]hrough charging decisions, the federal prosecutor owns the goods that are the
criminal justice system allocates: terms of imprisonment.‖).
112
―Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court
of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some
judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.‖ 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
113
There exist two basic types of plea bargains: charge bargains and sentence bargains. ―The
prosecutor can either reduce the charge to one with a lower average penalty than the charge the
defendant is facing, or offer a sentence more lenient than average by agreeing to a sentence at the
low end of the applicable range of sentences for the charge. These processes are generally referred
to as ‗charge bargaining‘ and ‗sentence bargaining.‘‖ Birke, supra note 9, at 219–20.
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crimes, mandatory minimum sentences (or other non-negotiable components of
punishment) block the first path to disposition by plea, and charge permutations
may not exist that will allow the parties to reach mutually agreeable terms.
All else being equal, mandatory sentences will frustrate plea bargaining by
limiting the parties‘ ability to negotiate acceptable terms. 114 More broadly, a
defendant may be relatively uninspired to enter a guilty plea to a crime for which
a large share of the punishment represents an unavoidable incident of any
conviction, whether by plea or trial. Custody time is one form of punishment, but
it is not necessarily the only result of a criminal conviction. A conviction also
may lead to fines,115 deportation,116 registration as a sex offender,117 restrictions
on voting118 and gun-ownership rights,119 preclusion from certain types of
employment,120 a wide variety of probation conditions,121 and stigma.122 Some of
these consequences may be non-negotiable, in the sense that the plausible plea
options do not allow the defendant to avoid them. If so, the value of a guilty plea,
or plea bargain, will be correspondingly less to the defense, and defendant will be
relatively inclined to go to trial.
Of course, mandatory minimum sentences may not defeat plea bargaining;
they may instead merely shift the parties‘ attention toward charge bargaining, in
which one or more counts are dismissed (or never filed) in return for a
defendant‘s guilty plea to other charges. Here, charge substance can catalyze or
chill plea bargaining. Crimes vary in the extent to which they stand alone within a
See Birke, supra note 9, at 226 (observing that ―the existence of a mandatory sentencing
regime increases the punishment value of a plea more than it increases the punishment value of a
trial, and should militate in favor of more trials.‖); Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 298 (noting that
mandatory penalties may make settlements less frequent, insofar as they may decrease the gains of
trade).
115
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.2 (2011) (relating Guideline ranges
for fines).
116
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS & THE
PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, INTERNAL EXILE: CONSEQUENCES
OF CONVICTION IN FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS 43–45 (2009).
117
Id. at 41–42.
118
Id. at 15.
119
Id. at 42–43.
120
Id. at 19–27.
121
See Andrew Horwitz, Coercion, Pop-Psychology, and Judicial Moralizing: Some
Proposals for Curbing Judicial Abuse of Probation Conditions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 75,
11053 (2000) (relating a wide variety of probation conditions); Note, Judicial Review of
Probation Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 18288 (1967) (same).
122
―Stigma is characterized as an external incentive founded on the reluctance of individuals
to interact with a person who breaches social norms. Stigma can be either economic (for example,
lower wages) or social (for example, difficulty in finding a spouse).‖ Alon Harel & Alon Klement,
The Economics of Stigma: Why More Detection of Crime May Result in Less Stigmatization, 36 J.
LEGAL STUD. 355, 355 (2007). For a robust discussion of stigma and its relationship to
punishment, see W. David Ball, The Civil Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure: In re
Winship, Stigma, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117, 146–48 (2011).
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code, or are ensconced among multiple related offenses. This, too, is a function of
crime content; some crimes involve behavior that is closely connected to other
offenses (such as gun crimes and drug offenses, or theft and possession of stolen
property), while other courses of criminal conduct tend to implicate only a single
crime, which must be charged on its own, or not at all. Depending on the scenario,
these crime clusters may be either conducive or inhospitable to plea bargaining.
Furthermore, a crime‘s position within this grouping will affect its encouragement
of, and disposition within, these deals.
The connections, if any, that may exist between a crime and other offenses
matter because of their effect upon both initial charging practices (which may
prompt plea negotiations), and plea deals themselves. Stacked charges oftentimes
produce asymmetrical stakes for the parties, which may be conducive to horsetrading. If a crime tends to overlap with other offenses, such that a given course of
conduct by a defendant implicates multiple different crimes, prosecutors may be
in a position to charge all of the implicated offenses.123 Doing so may encourage a
defendant to enter into plea talks if the allegation of multiple offenses either
increases the likelihood of conviction or threatens greater punishment upon
conviction.124 At the same time, the prosecution may not have an equivalent,
offsetting desire to retain the additional charges, particularly if they are in some
way ancillary to the gist of the defendant‘s misconduct.125 A prosecutor may be
willing to jettison these surplus counts, if doing so induces a plea to the central
allegations in the case.
In some situations, however, tight bonds among related offenses may have
the opposite effect, chilling plea negotiations and pushing cases toward trial. If
even one charged offense among several is susceptible to trial, the parties may
decide to try all of the other charges, as well; since a trial will take place anyway,
the incremental cost of trying the additional counts may be relatively low. This
dynamic may appear when the charge that draws others to trial threatens
significant irreducible punishment, and represents the crux of the state‘s case
against the defendant. Under these circumstances, this ―immovable‖ and
―irreducible‖ count is less likely to become the subject of bargaining. When this
situation arises, charges that normally would produce plea bargains are effectively
dragged to trial by other offenses. Furthermore, charge-stacking may add to the
complexity of a criminal case and, by doing so, prevent the parties from agreeing
upon a disposition by introducing disagreement as to likely outcomes.
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STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 57, at 263.
Id.
125
See Graham, Facilitating Crimes, supra note 60, at 693 (discussing how crimes such as
hostage-taking (18 U.S.C. § 1203) and use of fire or explosives in the commission of a federal
felony (18 U.S.C. § 844(h)) are often dismissed pursuant to plea bargains).
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The positioning of a crime relative to other offenses affects plea
bargaining as much as its proximity to these crimes does. All else being equal, a
crime is more susceptible to charge bargaining126 when it claims attractive
―landing points‖ for these deals. These ―landing points‖ are related offenses that
carry a gravamen similar to that of the bargained-down crime, but with slightly
less severe sentencing consequences.127 As a corollary, crimes positioned near the
top of the sentencing ―slope‖ that is created by mapping the penalties attached to
related crimes presumably will produce more charge bargains, though this may be
offset by prosecutorial reluctance to offer significant concessions when serious
offenses are involved. Less severe crimes within a cluster of related offenses will
generate fewer such agreements.128 So too will crimes that lack any related
offenses that may function as ―landing points.‖ 129
From the text above, one might conclude that crimes tend to produce
more, and more consistently framed, pleas when they are simple to prove, alleged
with significant frequency, and have ―stakes‖ as to which both the prosecution
and the defense can obtain significant value from a plea, relative to trial. In
essence, the more a crime can be commoditized, the more susceptible it will be to
plea bargaining. The next section of this article seeks to put flesh on the bones of
this hypothesis by reviewing several years‘ worth of federal charging and case
termination data.
III.

FEDERAL DATA ON PLEA BARGAINING AND TRIALS

The Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AOUSC) collects a
wealth of information regarding each criminal case that terminates in federal
district court.130 One series of datasets, released annually, includes the judicial
district in which each prosecution occurred, the five ―most serious‖ charges filed
as to each defendant (as determined by the ―base offense level‖ assigned to the

There exist two basic types of plea bargains: charge bargains and sentence bargains. ―The
prosecutor can either reduce the charge to one with a lower average penalty than the charge the
defendant is facing, or offer a sentence more lenient than average by agreeing to a sentence at the
low end of the applicable range of sentences for the charge. These processes are generally referred
to as ‗charge bargaining‘ and ‗sentence bargaining.‘‖ Birke, supra note 9, at 219–20.
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Wright & Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a Criminal Code on Charging,
Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, supra note 19, at 195354. For a discussion of how
prosecutors and defense attorneys locate and agree upon plausible landing points, see David
Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender Office,
12 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 255, 258–59, 262–64 (1965).
128
Wright & Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a Criminal Code on Charging,
Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, supra note 19, at 195355.
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Id.
130
AOUSC Database, supra note 2.
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crime under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines131), the five ―most serious‖
charges at the time of case termination, the manner in which these charges were
resolved (e.g., dismissal by the prosecution, guilty plea, or conviction or acquittal
at trial132), the sentence issued by the court, and related information.133
The discussion below draws upon these records to explore the connections
that may exist among charge substance, plea bargaining, and trial rates.
Specifically, the text will consider data regarding criminal cases that terminated in
federal district court between October 1, 2002 and September 30, 2009.134 This
information comes from AOUSC datasets compiled for FY2003 (October 1, 2002
to September 30, 2003) through FY2009 (October 1, 2008 to September 30,
2009).135
This review will begin with some aggregate information concerning the
records in the database and summary data regarding plea bargaining, trial
frequency, and trial outcomes. The analysis then will turn to a review of specific
crimes with extremely high and low charge-bargain, trial, and acquittal rates. As
will be shown, offenses perched at these extremes tend to share certain
characteristics, patterns that hint at the effects that charge content may have on
plea bargaining and trials.

The ―base offense level‖ represents the starting point for sentencing calculations under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, with higher base offense levels translating into lengthier
Guidelines-prescribed advisory terms. ROGER W. HAINES, JR., FRANK O. BOWMAN, III & JENNIFER
C. WOLL, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK 1305 (2010).
132
The principal disposition codes used by the AOUSC are: 1 (dismissal), 2 (acquittal after a
bench trial); 3 (acquittal after a jury trial), 4 (guilty plea), 5 (nolo contendere plea), 8 (conviction
after a bench trial), 9 (conviction after a jury trial), A (nolle prosequi), B (pretrial diversion), C
(mistrial), and D (dismissed without prejudice). E.g., INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RESEARCH, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS PROGRAM: DEFENDANTS IN
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES IN DISTRICT COURT-TERMINATED, 2007 [UNITED STATES] 144 (2008).
133
As to each record, the dataset relates 177 fields of information. For purposes of this
article, the most important of these fields are DISTRICT, which identifies the judicial district in
which a case was filed; FLINDEX1, FLINDEX2, FLINDEX3, FLINDEX4, and FLINDEX5,
which relate the codes assigned to the five ―most serious‖ initial charges in a case (with these
codes typically taking the form of the title and section of the United States Code that relates the
offense, as well as additional identifying elements in situations where a statute describes more
than one crime); TRINDEX1, TRINDEX2, TRINDEX3, TRINDEX4, and TRINDEX5, which
relate the codes assigned to the five ―most serious‖ charges at the time of case termination; DISP1,
DISP2, DISP3, DISP4, and DISP5, which relate the disposition of the five ―most serious‖ crimes;
PRISTOT, which relates the total prison time imposed upon each defendant; TTSECMO, which
relates the title and section of the United States Code of the most serious terminating offense in the
case; and FILEINDEX, which relates which, among the initial charges, represented the most
serious charging offense.
134
Earlier datasets (e.g., for FY2000, FY2001, and FY2002) in the same BJS / AOUSC
series do not provide complete information regarding case outcomes, and thus were not included
within the study.
135
AOUSC Database, supra note 2.
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A. Basic Information
The dataset compiled from the AOUSC records consists of 623,430
records in all.136 As contained in the database, each record relates to a single
defendant in a single case, such that one case that involves multiple defendants
may entail several records. For convenience, however, the text below will refer to
each record as a separate ―case.‖
Of the 623,430 cases contained within the database, 538,085 involve at
least one count that was resolved via a guilty or no-contest plea.137 Meanwhile,
25,190 cases include at least one count that was resolved via a trial verdict.138 (In
all, the database relates the outcome of 1,231,640 terminated counts, or
charges.139) Overall, 21 percent of counts tried to a verdict140 yielded acquittals,
leaving an overall conviction rate of 79 percent.141 The overall acquittal rate is
skewed upward by a large number of trials of miscellaneous vehicle-code
infractions that occur on federal property. These trials often result in acquittals.142
If these cases are removed from the database, the acquittal rate drops to 20
percent of all counts.143
The roster of federal offenses is too extensive to assess the pleading and
trial practices that surround each and every crime. Instead, the text below will
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Id.
Id.
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Id.
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Id. Crimes have been assigned identification codes by the AOUSC. A list of the codes, as
made available through the website for the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania,
can
be
found
at
http://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/Documents/Forms/Criminal%20Citation%20Manual.pdf
(henceforth ―Criminal Citation Manual.‖) This total number of counts in the database does not
include every charge that was alleged and resolved in a criminal case over the studied period,
however. Each case within the database relates only the five ―most serious‖ charges at the time of
original filing, and at case termination. Thus, to the extent that a criminal case alleged a sixth,
seventh, or higher count, the dataset does not capture this information. Though a gap, only a small
percentage of federal cases involve more than five counts. The truncation therefore has only a
modest effect on the overall results―though it may have a more substantial impact on data
relating to those crimes, such as wire fraud and mail fraud, which are sometimes alleged in bulk.
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AOUSC Database, supra note 2. The very few counts that reported a guilty or not-guilty
verdict on an insanity plea were disregarded for purposes of determining conviction rates.
141
Id. This acquittal-rate figure likely understates defendants‘ overall trial ―success‖ on a
count-by-count basis. The AOUSC does not assign a distinct code to count dismissals that occur in
the course of trial, as opposed to dismissals that occur at an earlier point in the proceedings. Thus,
for purposes of calculating acquittal rates, the author simply summed not-guilty verdicts issued by
juries and judges, and divided this total by the sum of jury and bench acquittals and convictions.
To the extent that mid-trial dismissals also represent defense ―wins,‖ the acquittal figures do not
capture these victories.
142
Id. These charges were assigned the code 18:13-7220.M within the AOUSC Database,
and have an acquittal rate of 64 percent. Id.
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focus on specific offenses, and in particular, those that lie at the extremes of the
plea bargaining and trial data.

B. Plea Bargaining
The AOUSC Database does not readily permit inquiries into simple
sentence bargaining, since it does not include information (such as each
defendant‘s criminal history, or the specific sentence enhancements or downward
departures implicated in a case) that affect the sentencing calculations that apply
to an individual defendant under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.144 By relating
the ―most serious‖ charges at the time of filing and case termination, however, the
data do allow for a study of charge bargaining in federal practice.145
For one thing, the data indicate that federal prosecutors are quite willing to
dismiss or reduce certain crimes pursuant to plea deals.146 Elsewhere, I have
referred to crimes that are commonly jettisoned in plea bargaining as ―charging
crimes.‖147 The inclusion of these crimes within cases may facilitate plea
bargaining insofar as they threaten significant incremental punishment upon
conviction, yet are understood by all parties as being subject to negotiation.
One rough proxy for a given crime‘s status as a charging crime is to assess
the frequency with which it relinquished its status as the most serious charging
offense (referred to in the tables below as ―MSCO‖) in a case pursuant to a plea.
This measure of the ―integrity rate‖ of an offense reflects the crime‘s
susceptibility to dismissal as part of a plea bargain. Following are crimes with
particularly low integrity rates over the FY2003FY2009 span:
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For roughly the latter two-thirds of the studied time period, the Sentencing Guidelines
were not mandatory, such that a sentencing judge did not necessarily have to regard a nominal
―most serious‖ offense as such. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
145
The base offense level represents an imperfect guide to charge severity. The assignment
of ―most serious‖ status based on base offense level alone may be inadequate where, for example,
large amounts of drugs or stolen money are involved. These amounts may substantially increase
the assigned punishment above that associated with the ―normal‖ base offense level for a crime.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B1.1(b)(1), 2D1.1(c) (2011) (relating the base
offense levels associated with amounts of money purloined and various drug quantities,
respectively).
146
Per Department of Justice policy in effect for much of the studied time period, as a
general matter, ―federal prosecutors must charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable
offense or offenses that are supported by the facts of the case.‖ John Ashcroft, Memorandum from
Attorney General to All Federal Prosecutors, Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal
Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing (Sept. 22, 2003) (on file with author), available
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm.
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Table I: Federal Felonies with Low “Integrity Rates”
FY2003-FY2009 (100+ MSCO Cases Involving Guilty / No Contest Pleas)148
Crime

Description

18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(a)149
18 U.S.C.
§ 1203150
18 U.S.C.
§ 844(h)151
18 U.S.C.
§ 924(j)152

Total Number of
MSCO Cases

MSCO Cases
Where Also Most
Serious Terminating
Offense (MSTO)

Integrity
Rate

Witness
tampering by
force / threat of
force

210

73

34.8%

Hostage taking

336

134

39.9%

321

131

40.8%

188

79

42.0%

Use of fire /
explosives in a
federal felony
Violent Crime /
Drugs / Gun /
Death Occurs

These crimes have something in common: They tend to be ancillary to the
gravamen of most criminal cases in which they appear.153 Witness tampering (18
U.S.C. § 1512(a)) presumes the existence of a pending, or potential, federal case.
So does hostage taking (18 U.S.C. § 1203), and the use of firearms or explosives
in the commission of another federal offense (18 U.S.C. § 844(h)). This common
characteristic ensures, first, that these charges are typically alleged with another
federal crime that may serve as the basis for a plea bargain; and second, that a
prosecutor will not believe herself to have bargained away the tent-pole of her
case if she chooses to dismiss the charge pursuant to a plea bargain to other
counts.
148

The table is derived from data in the AOUSC Database, supra note 2.
Section 1512(a) of Title 18 prohibits actual and attempted witness tampering by means of
force or threats of force. United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1293 (9th Cir. 1984). The
AOUSC uses a distinct code to identify those cases in which this tampering results in the death of
a witness.
150
―[W]hoever . . . seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain
another person in order to compel a third person or a governmental organization to do or abstain
from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the person detained, or
attempts or conspires to do so, shall be punished . . . .‖ 18 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (2006).
151
Under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h), whoever ―uses fire or an explosive to commit any felony
which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, or . . . carries an explosive during the
commission of any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States . . .‖ shall be
sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 844(h) (2006).
152
Per 18 U.S.C. § 924(j), ―a person who, in the course of a violation of subsection (c) [use
of a firearm in the commission of a federal felony], causes the death of a person through the use of
a firearm, shall—(1) if the killing is a murder (as defined in section 1111) be punished by death or
by imprisonment for any term of years or for life; and (2) if the killing is manslaughter (as defined
in section 1112), be punished as provided in that section.‖ 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) (2006).
153
Graham, Facilitating Crimes, supra note 60, at 694.
149

30

Other crimes, though not present within the table above, may catalyze plea
bargaining in similar ways. A crime that does not represent the most serious
charge in a case, but which threatens some additional punishment upon
conviction, also may encourage negotiations by providing the prosecution with an
expendable charge. It has been suggested, for example, that the enhancement for
the use of a firearm in the commission of a federal felony, codified at 18 U.S.C. §
924(c),154 often represents a ―bargaining chip‖ in federal drug cases.155 The data
provide some support for this supposition. Between FY 2003 and FY 2009, a total
of 26,680 section 924(c) charges were alleged in cases that resolved, in whole or
in part, by a defendant‘s guilty or no-contest plea.156 Of these § 924(c) charges,
fully 45 percent were dismissed either prior to, or as part of, the defendant‘s
plea.157 This is a relatively high figure,158 particularly for a crime that carries a full
consecutive sentence (such that its dismissal would not represent a pro forma act
by the prosecution); by comparison, less than 40 percent of all counts within the
database were dismissed in cases that terminated by plea.159
Meanwhile, the crimes that claim the highest integrity rates―which
suggests very few charge bargains, at least to those crimes in particular―were
misdemeanors.160 Among felonies, the crimes with the highest integrity rates
included:

154

Section 924(c) of Title 18 provides that a five-year (or higher) sentence enhancement is
to be imposed upon ―any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an
enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for
which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or
who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm.‖ 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006).
155
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL FIREARM OFFENDERS, 1992–98 6 (2000)
(discussing the frequent dismissal of 924(c) charges); Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 52, at 548–
49, 551–52 (remarking on the dismissal of 924(c) counts in certain types of cases).
156
AOUSC Database, supra note 2.
157
Id.
158
At the same time, a 45 percent dismissal rate pursuant to pleas is hardly extreme, or
particularly telling. Fully 71.9 percent of hostage-taking counts (18 U.S.C. § 1203) were dismissed
in cases resolved by plea, AOUSC Database, supra note 2, and several frequently alleged drug
crimes had dismissal rates hovering around 50 percent. Near the other end of the spectrum, counts
under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 were dismissed less than 10 percent of the time in pled matters. AOUSC
Database, supra note 2.
159
Id.
160
The following misdemeanors all claimed an integrity rate of at least 99.5 percent: 18
U.S.C. § 1028(a) (fraud with identification documents); 18 U.S.C. § 1703(b) (delay or destruction
of mail); 18 U.S.C. § 3615 (failure to pay a fine); 26 U.S.C. § 7203(c) (willful failure to file a tax
return); and 18 U.S.C. § 656 (theft or embezzlement by a bank officer). AOUSC Database, supra
note 2.
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Table II: Federal Felonies with High “Integrity Rates”
FY2003-FY2009 (250+ MSCO Cases Involving Guilty / No Contest Pleas)161
Crime

Description

18 U.S.C. § 4
18 U.S.C.
§ 751(a)162
18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)163
8 U.S.C.
§ 1326164
18 U.S.C.
§ 3146(a)165
18 U.S.C.
§ 922(n)166

Total Number
of MSCO
Cases

Number of MSCO
Cases Where Also
MSTO

Integrity
Rate

Misprision of a
felony

857

853

99.5%

Escape

1,564

1,549

99.0%

4,879

4,815

98.7%

85,779

83,984

97.9%

Failure to appear

462

450

97.4%

Interstate transp. of
a firearm / felon

1,130

1,099

97.3%

Sale, etc., of child
pornography
Re-entry by a
deported alien

Just as the offenses with the lowest integrity rates share certain attributes,
so do the crimes with the highest such rates.167 Namely, these crimes are among
161

The table is derived from data in the AOUSC Database, supra note 2.
―A conviction for escape under § 751(a) requires proof of three elements. The
Government must show that the defendant made 1) an unauthorized departure or escape, 2) from
custody of an institution where the prisoner is confined by direction of the Attorney General, 3)
where the custody or confinement is by virtue either of arrest for a felony or conviction of any
offense.‖ United States v. Taylor, 933 F.2d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 1991).
163
Subdivision (a) of section 18 U.S.C. § 2252 prohibits the sale, transportation, distribution,
receipt, or possession (provided a jurisdictional nexus is satisfied) of ―visual depiction[s] . . . [that
involve] the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,‖ where the depictions are of
such conduct. Id.
164
To the extent that the tables relate data involving 8 U.S.C. § 1326, the figures presented
relate the summed total for counts alleged under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(b), which were assigned separate codes within the AOUSC data. All three codes displayed
similar tendencies.
165
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a), a person who has been released by the court pending criminal
proceedings yet who ―fails to appear before a court as required by the conditions of release,‖ or
who ―fails to surrender for service of sentence pursuant to a court order,‖ is guilty of either a
felony or a misdemeanor, depending on the circumstances. Id. ―To establish a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 3146, the government ordinarily must prove that the defendant (1) was released pursuant
to that statute, (2) was required to appear in court, (3) knew that he was required to appear, (4)
failed to appear as required, and (5) was willful in his failure to appear.‖ Weaver v. United States,
37 F.3d 1411, 141213 (9th Cir. 1994).
166
―It shall be unlawful for any person who is under indictment for a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce
any firearm or ammunition or receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.‖ 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) (2006).
167
See Graham, Facilitating Crimes, supra note 60, at 692 (describing some of the
characteristics of crimes with high ―integrity rates‖). At the same time, the appearance of a crime
within this table does not preclude the possibility of plea bargaining along other dimensions. The
162
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the easiest federal crimes to prove. The simplicity of proving re-entry of a
deported felon already has been discussed. An escape charge is similarly easy to
establish: the defendant was in custody; then, they were not.168 Similarly, a charge
alleging a failure to appear is virtually bulletproof for the prosecution, assuming
that the defendant was previously advised of the need to show up in court (a
matter typically capable of ready and virtually unassailable proof by simple resort
to judicial minutes).169 With these offenses, defendants likely reason that a pretrial
guilty plea, with credit for early acceptance of responsibility, offers as good an
outcome as they can reasonably expect. Meanwhile, the crime with the highest
―integrity rate‖―misprision of a felony―is a ―pleading crime‖ that parties often
agree upon as the basis of a plea deal, often even before the prosecution files
charges.170

parties in drug cases can bargain over the quantities of drugs for which a defendant will be held
responsible; the defense and prosecution in a child-pornography may negotiate over the number of
images that the defendant possessed; etc. These quantities may have a significant impact on the
sentence ultimately imposed by the court. Likewise, in cases where the defendant committed the
same crime on multiple occasions, prosecutors may agree to dismiss a second, third, or additional
count that alleges the same offense as the ―lead‖ charge. See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 52,
at 548. In each of these instances, one must engage in a more sensitive analysis than the mere
documentation of integrity rates to understand the nature of the bargaining process.
168
Significantly, escape ―does not require that a defendant have a specific intent to escape;
all the prosecution must show is that the defendant knew that his actions would result in his
absence from confinement without permission.‖ United States v. Taylor, 933 F.2d 307, 310 (5th
Cir. 1991), citing United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
169
Weaver v. United States, 37 F.3d 1411, 141213 (9th Cir. 1994)
170
See Graham, Facilitating Crimes, supra note 60, at 69798 (discussing ―pleading
crimes‖).

33

C. Trials
Just as some crimes are more conducive to charge bargains than others
are, some offenses produce more trials than others do. Overall, only 4.4 percent of
all charged counts went to trial. 171 Yet significant variation in trial rates appears
across offenses. The following crimes proceeded to trial most often, relative to
how often they were alleged:
Table III: Highest Percentage of Counts Tried, Federal Felonies
FY2003-FY2009 (200+ Counts)172
Crime

18 U.S.C. § 242
26 U.S.C.
§ 7212(a)173
18 U.S.C.
§ 241174
18 U.S.C.
§ 924(j)
18 U.S.C. § 1959
(7474)175

Description

Deprivation of
Civil Rights
Corrupt / Forcible
Interference / IRS
Conspiracy Against
the Rights of
Citizens
Violent Crime /
Drugs / Firearm /
Death Occurs
Racketeering /
Violent Crimes

Total Number
of
Terminating
Counts

Total Number
of Tried
Counts

Percentage of
Counts Tried

481

145

30.1%

273

66

24.2%

406

93

22.9%

395

89

22.5%

227

50

22.0%

171

AOUSC Database, supra note 2. Counts that were dismissed by the prosecution at trial
are not assigned a code distinct from the ―generic‖ code for count dismissal, meaning that this 4.4
percent figure―which does not include dismissed counts―may slightly underestimate the total
number of tried counts.
172
The information in this table is derived from data in the AOUSC Database, supra note 2.
173
This statute, part of the Internal Revenue Code, makes it a federal offense to ―corruptly or
by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication) endeavor[] to
intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the United States acting in an official capacity
under this title, or in any other way corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any
threatening letter or communication) obstruct[] or impede[], or endeavor[] to obstruct or impede,
the due administration of this title.‖ 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (2006).
174
Under this statute, a felony has been committed ―If two or more persons conspire to
injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth,
Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same,‖ or
―If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent
to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured.‖ 18 U.S.C.
§ 241 (2006).
175
Section 1959 of Title 18 of the United States Code relates a felony offense when
someone, ―as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to
pay, anything of pecuniary value from an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, or for the
purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining or increasing position in an enterprise engaged in
racketeering activity, murders, kidnaps, maims, assaults with a dangerous weapon, commits
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Crime

Description

18 U.S.C. § 1958
(7471)176

Racketeering –
Murder
Embezzlement
Involving Federal
Programs

18 U.S.C.
§ 666(c)177

Total Number
of
Terminating
Counts

Total Number
of Tried
Counts

Percentage of
Counts Tried

427

92

21.5%

434

87

20%

Again, several of these crimes have something in common: they carry
extremely high stakes for both the prosecution and the defense―suggesting a
large ―non-negotiable‖ component in each prosecution. Indeed, several of these
crimes may be punishable by death.178 Meanwhile, the offenses related at 18
U.S.C. § 241 and § 242 commonly involve public officials as defendants. This
circumstance may frustrate plea bargaining for several reasons, as related in Part
II.A.1, supra. Somewhat similarly, while the offenses described at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(a) through (c) narrowly missed inclusion on the list of most commonly
tried crimes,179 their high trial rates underscore how the prosecution has a strong
incentive to spotlight these witness-intimidation and falsified-evidence cases
through robust prosecution, while the defendants in these matters already have
signaled their intention to fight the charges against them with all means at their
disposal.180

assault resulting in serious bodily injury upon, or threatens to commit a crime of violence against
any individual in violation of the laws of any State or the United States, or attempts or conspires
so to do.‖ 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) (2006).
176
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a),
Whoever travels in or causes another (including the intended victim) to
travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or uses or causes another (including the
intended victim) to use the mail or any facility of interstate or foreign
commerce, with intent that a murder be committed in violation of the laws of
any State or the United States as consideration for the receipt of, or as
consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value, or
who conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more
than ten years, or both; and if personal injury results, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned for not more than twenty years, or both; and if death results,
shall be punished by death or life imprisonment, or shall be fined not more than
$250,000, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1958 (2006).
177
This code denotes one of embezzlement offenses described at 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2006),
which makes it a federal crime to embezzle $5,000 or more from an institution that receives at
least $10,000 a year in federal benefits.
178
E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) (2006) (providing, through a cross-reference to 18 U.S.C. §
1111, for death as a possible punishment for murder though use of a firearm in the commission of
a federal drug-trafficking crime or federal crime of violence); 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(3)(A) (2006)
(providing, also through a cross-reference to 18 U.S.C. § 1111, for death as a possible punishment
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For purposes of comparison, the following federal felonies181 go to trial
the least often:
Table IV: Lowest Percentage of Counts Tried, Federal Felonies
FY2003-FY2009 (200+ Counts)182

Crime

Description

18 U.S.C. § 4183
8 U.S.C.
§ 1325184

Misprision of a felony

Total
Number of
Terminating
Counts
3,672

Improper entry by an alien

8 U.S.C. § 1326
18 U.S.C.
§ 1543185

Re-entry of a deported
alien
Forgery or use of a forged
passport

Total of
Tried
Counts

Percentage
of Counts
Tried

14

.4%

14,852

75

.5%

98,201

534

.5%

1,567

11

.7%

Unlike the most commonly tried crimes, these offenses tend to be minor
and easily commoditized, such that a ―going rate‖ for a guilty plea will coalesce
around them in short order. The appearance of 18 U.S.C. § 4 and 8 U.S.C. § 1326
on this list come as little surprise. As mentioned before, misprision of a felony is
invoked in connection with pre-arranged plea bargains; with 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (as
well as 8 U.S.C. § 1325), convictions are so easy to obtain, the defense receives
for the killing of a witness); 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) (2006) (providing for punishment by death or life
imprisonment if death results from a murder-for-hire scheme that involves interstate commerce).
179
The composite trial rate for the offenses related at 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a) through (c) was
19.3 percent. AOUSC Database, supra note 2.
180
The offense related at 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) is similarly situated.
181
The absolute lowest trial rate among all commonly charged federal crimes belongs to 18
U.S.C. § 1028(a) (fraud with identification documents), when charged as a misdemeanor, as to
which only four out of 4,989 terminating counts were resolved by trial.
182
The table is derived from data in the AOUSC Database, supra note 2.
183
As previously related, the low trial rate for 18 U.S.C. § 4 (misprision of a felony) owes to
its status as a pleading crime—an offense that the parties in a variety of cases in which other, more
serious crimes either were or might have been charged agree upon as a means of resolving these
cases by way of plea. See text accompanying note 170, supra. Tellingly, there were 3,376 reported
convictions among the 3,672 terminating counts ascribed to 18 U.S.C. § 4 within the database.
184
Under this statute, ―Any alien who (1) enters or attempts to enter the United States at any
time or place other than as designated by immigration officers, or (2) eludes examination or
inspection by immigration officers, or (3) attempts to enter or obtains entry to the United States by
a willfully false or misleading representation or the willful concealment of a material fact‖ is
guilty of a misdemeanor (for a first offense); subsequent convictions can lead to imprisonment for
up to two years. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006).
185
This offense applies to ―Whoever falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, mutilates, or alters
any passport or instrument purporting to be a passport, with intent that the same may be used; or
[¶] Whoever willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use, or furnishes to another for use any
such false, forged, counterfeited, mutilated, or altered passport or instrument purporting to be a
passport, or any passport validly issued which has become void by the occurrence of any condition
therein prescribed invalidating the same.‖ 18 U.S.C. § 1543 (2006).
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little to no benefit from taking a case to trial, relative to the early entry of a guilty
plea.
D. Trial Outcomes
On its own, data concerning trial rates says little about the relationship
between plea bargaining and the ease or difficulty of proving a charge. To
establish such a connection, one also must consider trial outcomes. Following are
the federal felonies with the highest acquittal rates at trial:
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Table V: High Acquittal Rates, Federal Felonies, 75+ Tried Counts
FY 2003FY2009186
High Acquittal
Rate
18 U.S.C. § 242
18 U.S.C. § 241
18 U.S.C.
§ 113(a)(3)187
21 U.S.C. § 844188
(marijuana)
18 U.S.C.
§ 113(a)(6)189
18 U.S.C.
§ 113(a)(1)190
18 U.S.C.
§ 2241(a)191
21 U.S.C. § 952
(marijuana)192

Offense Description
Deprivation of civil
rights
Conspiracy to deprive
of civil rights
Assault with a
dangerous weapon
Possession of
marijuana
Assault resulting in
serious bodily injury
Assault with intent to
murder
Aggravated sexual
abuse
Importation of
marijuana

Number of
Tried Counts

Number of
Count
Acquittals

Acquittal
Percentage

145

80

55.2%

93

44

47.3%

123

57

46.3%

97

44

45.4%

82

35

42.7%

173

70

40.5%

114

43

38.3%

189

71

37.6%

186

The table is derived from data in the AOUSC Database, supra note 2.
Section 113 of Title 18 of the United States Code concerns assaults committed within the
territorial or maritime jurisdiction of the United States. Per subdivision (a)(3), whoever commits
an ―[a]ssault with a dangerous weapon, with intent to do bodily harm, and without just cause or
excuse, by a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both.‖ 18 U.S.C.
§ 113(a)(3) (2006).
188
Under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), ―It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally
to possess a controlled substance unless such substance was obtained directly, or pursuant to a
valid prescription or order, from a practitioner, while acting in the course of his professional
practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter.‖ 21
U.S.C. § 844(a) (2006). The code above refers only to the possession of marijuana.
189
Per 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6), an ―[a]ssault resulting in serious bodily injury [is punishable]
by a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both.‖ 18 U.S.C.
§ 113(a)(6) (2006).
190
Per 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(1), an ―[a]ssault with intent to commit murder [is punishable] by
imprisonment for not more than twenty years.‖ 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(1) (2006).
191
This law, which essentially relates the crime of aggravated rape, provides that one who,
within the maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States or while in federal custody
―knowingly causes another person to engage in a sexual act--(1) by using force against that other
person; or (2) by threatening or placing that other person in fear that any person will be subjected
to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title,
imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both.‖ 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2006).
192
Per 21 U.S.C. § 952(a), ―It shall be unlawful to import into the customs territory of the
United States from any place outside thereof (but within the United States), or to import into the
United States from any place outside thereof‖ a variety of controlled substances, narcotics, or
ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or phenylpropanolamine. Id. The code above refers only to the
importation of marijuana, which is classified as a controlled substance under federal law. 21
C.F.R. § 1308.11 (2011). For unknown reasons, the AOUSC Database utilizes multiple codes for
marijuana importation; the figure above represents a composite of these codes. As will be
discussed infra, regardless of the code that is used to describe them, these charges exhibit similar
characteristics.
187
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High Acquittal
Rate
18 U.S.C. § 666(c)

18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(c)193

Offense Description

Number of
Tried Counts

Number of
Count
Acquittals

Acquittal
Percentage

87

31

35.6%

84

31

36.9%

Embezzlement
involving federal
programs
Obstruction /
Presentation of a
Falsified Document to
the Court

As well as the federal felonies with the lowest acquittal rates:
Table VI: Low Acquittal Rates, Federal Felonies, 75+ Tried Counts
FY 2003FY2009194
Code Section
26 U.S.C.
§ 7203(d)195
18 U.S.C.
§ 924(j)

21 U.S.C.
§ 841(g)=CP196
18 U.S.C.
§ 2251197

Offense
Description
Willful failure to
file a tax return
(felony)
Violent Crime /
Drugs / Machine
Gun / Where Death
Occurs
Possession of a
controlled
substance (date-rape
drugs) with intent to
distribute
Sexual exploitation
of children

Number of
Tried Counts

Number of
Acquittals

Acquittal
Percentage

91

4

4.4%

89

5

5.6%

96

7

7.3%

106

9

8.5%

Under this subsection of 18 U.S.C. § 1512, ―Whoever corruptly—(1) alters, destroys,
mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to
impair the object‘s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or (2) otherwise
obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.‖ The preceding provisions of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512, which concern witness intimidation through force or violence (or the threat thereof), also
featured high acquittal rates. The acquittal rate for charges under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a) stood at 23.5
percent; the rate for charges under § 1512(b), at 34.4 percent. AOUSC Database, supra note 2.
194
The table is derived from data in the AOUSC Database, supra note 2.
195
Under this section of the Internal Revenue Code, failure to file a form relating a cash
transaction of $10,000 or more in the course of business is punishable as a felony. This crime is
sometimes implicated in complex cases with a money-laundering component. See BickhamLincoln-Mercury Inc. v. United States, 168 F.3d 790, 793 (5th Cir. 1999) (describing the nature of
reporting requirement implicated by section 7203‘s felony provision).
196
Subdivision (g) of 21 U.S.C. § 841 applies specifically to sales of ―date-rape‖ drugs over
the Internet. Under subdivision (g)(1), ―Whoever knowingly uses the Internet to distribute a date
rape drug to any person, knowing or with reasonable cause to believe that—(A) the drug would be
used in the commission of criminal sexual conduct; or (B) the person is not an authorized
purchaser; shall be fined under this subchapter or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.‖ 21
U.S.C. § 841(g)(1) (2006).
193
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Code Section
18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(d)198
18 U.S.C.
§ 876199
8 U.S.C. § 1326
18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)
21 U.S.C.
§ 848200

Offense
Description
Bank robbery /
theft, ADW
Mailing threats,
ransom letters, etc.
Re-entry of a
deported alien
Sale, distribution, or
possession of child
pornography
Continuing criminal
enterprise

Number of
Tried Counts

Number of
Acquittals

Acquittal
Percentage

135

12

8.9%

86

8

9.3%

534

51

9.6%

379

39

10.3%

117

13

11.1%

Particularly when mapped against trial rates, this information indicates
that substantial variation exists among crimes in their conduciveness to guilty
verdicts at trial.201 The data also help plea-bargaining dynamics come into better
This crime applies to ―any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or
coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who
transports any minor in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or
Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit
conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of
transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct,‖ assuming that a jurisdictional prerequisite is
satisfied. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (2006).
198
Section 2113, subdivision (a) of Title 18 relates two somewhat distinct crimes. The first
is essentially bank robbery; this crime applies to one who ―by force and violence, or by
intimidation,‖ or by extortion, takes or attempts to take property, money, or anything else of value
from a bank or similar financial institution. The second of these offenses amounts to bank
burglary; it creates the felony crime of entering or attempting to enter a bank or like establishment
with the intent to commit therein any felony affecting the institution, or larceny. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a). Subdivision (b) of the statute makes it a federal crime to ―take[] and carr[y] away, with
intent to steal or purloin, any property or money or any other thing of value . . . belonging to, or in
the care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, credit union, or any savings
and loan association.‖ Subdivision (d) of this statute, meanwhile provides that ―[w]hoever, in
committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in subsections (a) and (b) of this
section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous
weapon or device, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or
both.‖ 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (2006).
199
Section 876 of Title 18 makes it a federal crime to use the mails to send ransom letters or
threatening communications. What is likely most commonly invoked provision of this statute
relates, ―Whoever knowingly so deposits [in any post office or authorized depository for mail
matter] or causes to be delivered [by the Postal Service according to the direction thereon] . . . any
communications with or without a name or designating mark subscribed thereto, addressed to any
other person and containing . . . any threat to injure the person of the addressee or of another, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.‖ 18 U.S.C. § 876 (2006).
200
To prove a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848, the government must establish that ―(1) the
defendant committed a felony violation of the federal narcotics laws, (2) the violation was part of
a continuing series of violations, (3) the series of offenses occurred in concert with five or more
persons, (4) the defendant was an organizer, supervisor, or manager, and (5) the defendant
obtained substantial income or resources from the series of violations.‖ United States v. SotoBeníquez, 356 F.3d 1, 25 (1st Cir. 2003).
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The high trial rates for 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 crimes indicate that their high acquittal
rates are not the product of selection bias, i.e., that only a very small subset of particularly weak
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focus. The most frequently tried crime, 18 U.S.C. § 242, also happens to be the
offense with the highest acquittal rate at trial. The third most frequently tried
crime, 18 U.S.C. § 241, claims the second-highest acquittal rate. Meanwhile,
embezzlement from a federal program (18 U.S.C. § 666(c)) also appears on both
the list of most commonly tried crimes and the roster of crimes that most often
lead to acquittal at trial; and presentation of a falsified document to a court (18
U.S.C. § 1512(c)) and aggravated sexual abuse (18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)), both of
which appear on the latter list, fell just short of appearing on the list of most
frequently tried charges.202 At the other extreme, the 8 U.S.C. § 1326 series of
offenses has among the highest conviction rates at trial, even accounting for the
extremely low percentage of these cases that are put before a judge or jury.203 It
seems doubtful that these overlaps represent mere coincidences. On the contrary,
these results suggest that, at least under the right conditions, trial outcomes can
have a substantial impact of trial rates, and by inference, on plea bargaining.
These results also underscore the importance of code substance, together
with code structure, in pushing cases toward trial. Aggravated assault, such as the
crimes specified by 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) and (c), can be difficult to prove. These
cases often entail situations in which the prosecution‘s witnesses were distracted,
drunk, themselves complicit in wrongdoing, or are incapable of remembering
matters clearly the time of trial. These concerns will lead prosecutors to reject
many of these cases. Yet even in those cases that are filed, the outcome may turn
on the credibility of the prosecution‘s witnesses. Here, a jury‘s assessment of a
witness may not be the same as the prosecutor‘s. This disconnect, which may be
inevitable across assault cases but is incapable of prediction in any given case,
will produce a relatively large number of acquittals when these cases go to trial.
One might think that this dynamic would encourage prosecutors to pleabargain. It might, but for the fact that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for
assault feature a sentencing ―cliff.‖ For a first offender, the Guidelines
recommend a sentence of at least 70 months for assault with intent to murder;204
for aggravated assault, a minimum term of at least 15 months is recommended.205
Enhancements for use of a weapon in connection with the offense and the
infliction of bodily injury upon the victim can increase these figures
cases are proceeding to trial. Compare the circumstances that surround charges of marijuana
importation (21 U.S.C. § 952), discussed at the text accompanying notes 247–266, infra.
202
Approximately 16 percent of all terminated 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) counts within the
database were resolved by way of trial. AOUSC Database, supra note 2.
203
Overall, of the 98,201 termination counts that alleged a § 1326 charge, 88,370 related a
conviction. This conviction percentage of 90 percent trails only 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 4 (both of which claimed a conviction rate of approximately 92 percent) among crimes with
1,000 or more terminating counts within the AOUSC Database. AOUSC Database, supra note 2.
204
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A2.1; Sentencing Table (2011).
205
Id., § 2A2.2; Sentencing Table.
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substantially.206 The Guideline for simple assault, by contrast, advises a sentence
of zero to six months in custody.207 Moreover, there is a significant symbolic loss
to the prosecution in reducing a felony such as aggravated assault to a
misdemeanor;208 particularly when the victim suffered significant harm,
prosecutors may balk at such a diminution of the charge. Given these
considerations, a prosecutor in an aggravated assault case may regard a charge
reduction to simple assault as giving up too much. The high odds of acquittal and
lack of attractive plea options leads one to forecast that a relatively high
percentage of counts alleging aggravated assault will go to trial. And this turns out
to be true; 9.7 percent of § 113(a) counts and 9.2 percent of § 113(c) counts go to
trial, as compared to the overall trial rate of 4.4 percent of all counts within the
AOUSC Database.209
Even though the data, on their face, shed some light on trial and pleabargaining decisions, they also contain some mysteries, such as why 18 U.S.C. §
924(j) has among the highest trial rates, when it also claims one of the lowest
acquittal rates among federal offenses. The text below thus relates a series of
―case studies‖ that more carefully consider the influences upon plea bargaining
that surround individual crimes.
IV.

CASE STUDIES

To gain a better appreciation about how the quirks of particular offenses
may influence decision-making in criminal cases, this Part will consider the pleabargaining patterns that surround specific offenses that appear in the tables above,
and which either define the extremes of plea or trial practice, or exhibit interesting
plea or trial patterns. Specifically, the text below will evaluate the plea and trial
patterns that surround the crimes related at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (deprivation of civil
206

The Sentencing Guidelines call for a three-level increase in base offense level if a
dangerous weapon is brandished, or its use threatened, in commission of the offense; a four-level
increase if the dangerous weapon was actually used, short of discharge of a firearm; and a fivelevel increase if a firearm is discharged in connection with the offense. Id., § 2A2.2(b)(2).
Enhancements for injuries to the victim begin with a three-level increase for bodily injury and
escalate to a seven-level increase for permanent or life-threatening bodily injury. Id.,
§ 2A2.2(b)(3). These weapon and injury enhancements, put together, cannot increase the base
offense level by more than ten levels. Id.
207
18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(4), (a)(5) (2006); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A2.3;
Sentencing Table (2011).
208
Wright & Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a Criminal Code on Charging,
Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, supra note 19, at 1967 (noting the significance of the felony /
misdemeanor distinction). Interestingly, Wright and Engen observe significant felony-tomisdemeanor charge movement among assault cases in their study of portions of the North
Carolina code. Id. at 196061.
209
AOUSC Database, supra note 2.
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rights under color of law); 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (re-entry of a deported alien); 18
U.S.C. § 924(j) (use of a firearm in the commission of a federal felony, in which
death occurs); 18 U.S.C. § 952 (importation of a narcotic or controlled substance;
here, were are specifically concerned with the importation of marijuana); and 26
U.S.C. § 7201 (tax evasion).
A. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (Deprivation of Civil Rights Under Color of Law)
Section 242 charges implicate almost a ―perfect storm‖ of factors that
combine to push cases to trial: they are difficult to prove, they implicate a class of
defendants with whom juries may empathize, they are relatively rare, they lack
attractive plea-bargaining landing points, and there exists political pressure to
bring these cases, such that, even granting rigorous screening by the Department
of Justice, prosecutors file and try a relatively large percentage of cases with a
substantial likelihood of acquittal.
Section 242 is a civil-rights crime.210 It provides that ―Whoever, under
color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any
person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different
punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by
reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens,‖ is
guilty of a felony.211 Many § 242 cases are brought against law-enforcement
officers.212 The charges in these matters frequently allege that the defendant or
defendants used excessive force.213
Proving these charges beyond a reasonable doubt can be difficult.214
Section 242 has been construed as requiring a specific intent to deprive an
210

The story surrounding the enactment 18 U.S.C. § 242 is described in Edward F. Malone,
Legacy of the Reconstruction: The Vagueness of the Criminal Civil Rights Statutes, 38 UCLA L.
REV. 163, 17179 (1990). For a history of prosecutions under § 242, see generally James P.
Turner, Police Accountability in the Federal System, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 991 (1999).
211
18 U.S.C. § 242 (2006).
212
Brian R. Johnson and Phillip B. Bridgmon, Depriving Civil Rights: An Exploration of 18
U.S.C. 242 Criminal Prosecutions 2001–2006, 34 CRIM. JUST. REV. 196, 198 (2009) (―Section
242 is aimed at public officers who abuse the constitutional or statutory rights of others‖); Steven
Puro, Federal Responsibility for Police Accountability Through Criminal Prosecution, 22 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 95, 106–11 (2003) (relating data on federal prosecutions under § 242 from
1985 to 2011).
213
Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 93rd Cong. 6777
(1973) (statement of K. William O‘Connor, Deputy Assistant Att‘y Gen., Civil Rights Division,
Department of Justice) (hereinafter ―Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws―O’Connor
Statement‖).
214
See Seth Mydans, Tough Task Ahead in Beating Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1992, at A8
(describing official-misconduct civil-rights charges as difficult to prove). These problems are of

43

individual of his or her civil rights, as opposed to merely a general intent to
commit an act that leads to injury.215 This element presents at least two difficulties
for the prosecution, even in the best of cases. First, it can be difficult to
communicate what this element actually means, and how it maps against the
evidence.216 Second, the evidence that the prosecution relies upon to show intent
in these cases may be ambiguous, or susceptible to impeachment or rebuttal. 217 In
addition, to the extent that § 242 cases typically involve police officers, juries
have been known to nullify their instructions even when, objectively, guilt has
been established beyond a reasonable doubt.218 Here, the personalities of the
defendants and victims may loom large; as the Civil Rights Division of the
Department of Justice has explained, ―The victims of most official misconduct
cases tend to be unsympathetic while the defendants often are well respected
members of the community.‖219
These issues collude to produce high acquittal rates at trial. The data in
Part III show an acquittal rate of more than 50 percent for § 242 counts tried

longstanding vintage. See, e.g., 2 Ex-Cops Win Acquittal in Beating Trial, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
Apr. 24, 1954, at 7 (relating the acquittal of two police officers in a federal civil-rights case).
215
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 104 (1945). See also Michael J. Pastor, A Tragedy
and a Crime? Amadou Diallo, Specific Intent, and the Federal Prosecution of Civil Rights
Violations, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL‘Y 171, 176–84 (2002) (discussing the intent element
and how lower courts have construed it).
216
Turner, supra note 210, at 1001 (observing that specific intent ―has remained a troubling
element of proof for prosecutors to meet‖ in these cases). See also John Frank, City Rarely
Prosecutes Civil Rights Complaints, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 1, 2004, at A1 (―Justice Department
officials have said that civil rights cases against law enforcement officers are difficult to prosecute
because of problems with the interpretation and perception of the law against civil rights abuses
carried out ‗under the color of law.‘ ‖).
217
See Steven Puro, Federal Responsibility for Police Accountability Through Criminal
Prosecution, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 95, 102 (2003) (observing that in section 241 and 242
cases, ―major difficulties for prosecutorial success [include] standards of proof [and] juries‘
willingness to believe the police and the justification for their activities.‖); Mydans, supra note
214 (describing ―the difficulty of proving criminal intent‖ as ―one main reason‖ why officialmisconduct criminal rights cases are difficult to prove); Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws,
supra note 213, at 6774 (opining that the jury instructions in section 242 cases ―which require the
government to prove that the defendant acted with the specific intent to deprive the victim of a
constitutional right‖ help explain the low acquittal rate in these matters). See also Frank, supra
note 216 (―Justice Department officials have said that civil rights cases against law enforcement
officers are difficult to prosecute because of problems with the interpretation and perception of the
law against civil rights abuses carried out ‗under the color of law.‘ ‖).
218
Turner, supra note 210, at 1109 (noting that ―Jury nullification occurs in too many
[section 242] cases.‖)
219
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 1998, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
House of Representatives, Part 2: Justification of Budget Estimates, 105th Cong. 482 (1997).
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within the FY2003FY2009 case-termination period.220 This figure comports
with an earlier study of official-misconduct cases tried between 1985 and 2001,
which found that ―[o]nce the Criminal Section brought a [section 242] law
enforcement case to trial, there was substantial difficulty in obtaining a
conviction.‖221 Specifically, over this span, ―there were 254 convictions and 225
acquittals, an average of 15 convictions and 13 acquittals per year.‖ 222 If anything,
these cases have been getting easier to prove; reports of prosecutions during the
1970s and 1960s reveal even higher acquittal rates. 223
Once again, one might expect that these impediments would be anticipated
by prosecutors, and lead to the extensive screening of these cases. And this
expectation would be correct; statistics show a much lower filing rate for § 242
cases referred for potential prosecution than for other types of offenses. 224 Even
with this rigorous screening, however, § 242 cases produce high acquittal rates.
The reasons are likely threefold: political pressures may lead to the filing of
official-misconduct civil-rights cases even when there exists a relatively high
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Within the universe of cases within the AOUSC Database that involved at least one tried
section 242 count, if one removes these § 242 charges from these cases, the acquittal rate at trial
for the remaining charges drops to 40.3 percent. If one also removes counts under 18 U.S.C. § 241
from these matters, the acquittal rate drops to 32.7 percent. AOUSC Database, supra note 2.
221
Puro, supra note 217, at 113.
222
Id. Johnson and Bridgmon, supra note 212, found that only 21 out of the 186 section 242
cases filed between 2001 and 2006 led to acquittals. Id. at 202. Though the author has neither
confirmed nor refuted this finding, these data are not necessarily inconsistent with Puro‘s findings
of a high acquittal rate, or the data in the AOUSC Database. Even acknowledging the high trial
rate associated with § 242 charges, more of these cases produce guilty pleas than go to trial.
Within the subset of cases that go to trial, a given case may involve an acquittal on one count and
a conviction on another. Johnson and Bridgmon appear to count this result as a conviction,
whereas the AOUSC Database records both the conviction counts and acquittal counts.
223
Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws―O’Connor Statement, supra note 213, at 6774
(observing that during fiscal year 1973, of the 52 police-officer defendants whose § 242 cases
involved the alleged use of excessive force, four had their cases dismissed at the government‘s
motion, four pleaded guilty, 44 were tried, and only nine of these 44 were convicted―and noting
this 25 percent overall conviction rate represented a significant increase from the conviction rate
in similar cases in prior years); Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, 93rd Cong. 3160 (1972) (statement of Burke Marshall) (reporting that of the 78 section
242 cases brought by the Department of Justice since January 1, 1970, 67 had gone to trial,
leading to convictions in only 12 of these cases, with only five convictions by jury). These
acquittals were not just the products of jury nullification; in one high-profile section 242 case—the
prosecution of the National Guardsmen who shot antiwar protesters at Kent State University in
1970—the trial court granted a defense motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the close of
the prosecution‘s case. JAMES P. TURNER, THE OTHER SIDE OF THE MOUNTAIN: AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 24647 (2008).
224
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, UNDER COLOR OF LAW (December
1, 2004), available at http://www.trac.syr.edu/tracreports/civright/107/.
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likelihood of acquittal,225 prosecutors may not fully account for juror reluctance to
convict public officials of a crime, and once a § 242 case is filed, there exist few
attractive plea-bargaining options for the parties.226
As to the last of these factors, while other types of cases may claim
attractive plea-bargaining ―landing points,‖ there are few such alternatives with
§ 242 charges.227 In § 242 cases that involve excessive force (as many do),
possible compromise offenses might include simple or aggravated assault. But
federal courts lack jurisdiction over basic assault crimes except in rare cases,
mostly involving admiralty or territorial jurisdiction (such as assaults that occur
on military bases). In any event, from the prosecution‘s perspective, to
compromise away the civil-rights component of these cases would essentially
abandon the federal interest in prosecution. Sentence bargains, in which the
defendant receives a modest term of incarceration in exchange for a guilty plea,
are equally unlikely given the notoriety of, and political pressures that surround,
many § 242 cases. In this environment, few prosecutors will accede to the steep
concessions that defendants (cognizant of the high odds of acquittal) will demand.
And so, many of these cases will proceed to trial.
B. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (Re-entry of a Deported Alien)
Unlike counts under 18 U.S.C. § 242, charges brought under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326 (re-entry by a deported alien) rarely go to trial. Moreover, as evidenced by
the high integrity rate of § 1326 charges, cases that allege this crime as the lead
count rarely produce charge bargains in which this count is replaced with another,
lesser charge. Instead, defendants tend to ―plead to the sheet‖ in these matters.
The prevalence of pleas to § 1326 counts, without any dismissal or
reduction in charges, seems easy to explain. For starters, as discussed in Part II228
225

See Frank, supra note 216 (observing that section 242 cases are infrequent, high-profile
matters). Well-publicized section 242 cases in recent memory include the prosecutions of the Los
Angeles Police Department officers who assaulted Rodney King, see United States v. Stacey C.
Koon, 7 FED. SENT. REP. 205, 205 (1995), and the prosecution of New York police officers who
assaulted Abner Louima in 1997, see United States v. Schwarz, 259 F.3d 59, 59 (2d Cir. 2001).
226
See Joseph Fried, Plea Deal Said to Be Rejected in Louima Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 22,
1999, at A1 (relating the prosecution‘s rejection of a plea-bargain offer made by a defendant in a
section 242 case).
227
Review of the most serious terminating charges in plea-bargained cases where the
original ―most serious‖ charge had been a § 242 count illustrates the relative dearth of ―landing
points‖ for plea bargains in cases that allege these crimes. These 114 cases ultimately produced
only nine different most serious terminating offenses, even if one counts § 242 twice (as both a
felony and a misdemeanor); a felony § 242 charge was the most serious terminating offense in 90
of these cases (or 78.9 percent). For purposes of comparison, 18 U.S.C. § 1519 was the most
serious charging offense in 145 cases, yet these cases resulted in 31 different most serious
terminating offenses, with the § 1519 charge representing the most serious terminating offense in
only 62 of these matters (or 42.8 percent). AOUSC Database, supra note 2.
228
See text accompanying notes 73–77, supra.
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and confirmed by the data presented in Part III,229 § 1326 charges are simple to
prove. As a result, prosecutors perceive no real need to bargain, and virtually all
defendants regard the two- or three-level reduction in base offense level for their
early acceptance of responsibility230 as representing a far better outcome than the
one they are likely to obtain from taking their case to trial. (Or, better yet, a
defendant may receive up to a four-level reduction pursuant to ―fast track‖ early
disposition proceedings, as are authorized in some districts where these cases are
prevalent.231) Meanwhile, the crime is not one where prosecutors will demand the
maximum possible penalty, such that they, too, are amenable to the sentencing
discounts that are available through these routes.
Other relevant circumstances also encourage the early entry of pleas to
§ 1326 counts. Even if this crime was difficult to establish, it lacks attractive
alternative charges for plea-bargain ―landing spots.‖232 Furthermore, § 1326
counts are only rarely charged together with additional crimes that, being more
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See text accompanying the tables at notes 161 and 182, supra.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2011).
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Id., § 5K3.1 (―Upon motion of the Government, the court may depart downward not more
than 4 levels pursuant to an early disposition program authorized by the Attorney General of the
United States and the United States Attorney for the district in which the court resides.‖) ―Fasttrack programs allow a prosecutor to offer a defendant a reduced sentence in exchange for the
defendant entering into a boilerplate plea agreement within a short period of time after indictment.
These programs are typically used for immigration and drug-smuggling offenses.‖ Evan W. Bolla,
An Unwanted Disparity: Granting Fast-Track Departures in Non-Fast-Track Districts, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 895, 896 (2006). Only certain districts have received approval for fast-track
proceedings, and these proceedings are limited to crimes that appear in such large volumes in
those districts that the abbreviated proceedings will conserve significant resources. A list of the
districts that offered ―fast track‖ dispositions as of 2008, and the types of crimes eligible for these
proceedings in these districts, can be found at Craig Morford, Acting Deputy Attorney General, to
United States Attorneys for the following Districts: Arizona, Central District of California, Eastern
District of California, Northern District of California, Southern District of California, Middle
District of Florida, Southern District of Florida, Northern District of Georgia, Idaho, Kansas,
Nebraska, New Mexico, Eastern District of New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Puerto Rico,
Southern District of Texas, Western District of Texas, Utah, Eastern District of Washington, and
Western District of Washington (Feb. 1, 2008) (on file with author), available at
http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/fast_track_reauthorization08.pdf (hereinafter ―Morford Letter‖). Where
fact-track proceedings are available, a large percentage of section 1326 pleas tend to involve fasttrack pleas. See, e.g., United States of America v. Krukowski, No. 04-CR-1308 (LAK),
Government‘s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Defendant‘s Motion for a NonGuidelines Sentence Based on the Existence of Fast-Track Programs, at 10 (observing that in
2004, the Southern District of California processed 1,878 section 1326 cases, with 1,388 of these
cases resolving through fast-track guilty pleas.).
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Section 1326 charges were rarely replaced as the most serious offense in a case that
resolved by plea. Only two other crimes (8 U.S.C. § 1325 (in 1,014 cases) and 18 U.S.C. § 1001
(in 108 cases)) supplanted section 1326 as the lead charge in more than 50 pled-out cases over the
studied time span, and overall, cases in which section 1326 represented the most serious initial
charge produced only 22 other most serious terminating charges (disregarding misdemeanor
variations of felony offenses already accounted for)―a very low figure, in light of the enormous
volume of section 1326 cases.
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hotly contested, may drag a § 1326 count into trial.233 And the substantial volume
of § 1326 cases leads to consistent plea expectations among both prosecutors and
the defense. The result is a crime at the opposite end of the spectrum from the 18
U.S.C. § 242 offense—one that produces very few trials, and very few acquittals
even in this limited universe of tried cases.234
The extremely low trial rates in § 1326 cases raise another, more sensitive
point. This article is not about race. But issues of race and ethnicity are bound up
in its claim that commoditized crimes are more subject to pleas than other
offenses are, and that the identity of the defendants associated with a crime may
affect the extent to which the offense lends itself to commoditization. This
argument implies that the more the outcome of a case hinges on idiosyncratic case
characteristics, the less likely it becomes that the parties will be to agree on the
terms of a plea bargain. At the other pole, if a crime contributes to the
commoditization of its defendants, it will lead to more pleas, and fewer trials.
Given its simple construction, § 1326 does not accommodate individual narratives
regarding a defendant‘s reasons for re-entry. Nevertheless, one might wonder
whether the high plea rates of the defendant class implicated by § 1326 results, at
least in part, from the fact that these defendants disproportionately lack the means
to develop these individualized narratives, or an audience receptive to these
explanations.
C. 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) (Use of a Firearm in the Commission of a Federal
Felony, Resulting in Death)
It is easy to understand how the character of, and circumstances
surrounding, 18 U.S.C. § 242 tends to produce both acquittals and trials, and why
8 U.S.C. § 1326 has the opposite profile of low acquittal rates, and few trials. By
comparison, the data surrounding 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) presents a bit of a mystery.
This crime is dismissed pursuant to plea deals more often than almost any
other federal felony.235 At the same time, this charge is also taken to trial
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Within the aggregate dataset, almost 90 percent (89.3%) of all cases in which the initial
charging document included a § 1326 charge alleged only that one single count, and no others. For
purposes of comparison, across the database as a whole, 52.1 percent of cases (325,093/623,430)
involved only a single initial charged count; 24.4 percent (152,173/623,430) involved two charged
counts; 9.7 percent (60,227/623,430) involved three charged counts, 5.6 percent (35,136/623,430)
involved four charged counts, and 8.1 percent (50,801/623,430) involved five or more charged
counts.
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The fact that almost 90 percent of all § 1326 counts during the studied time period
ultimately resulted in convictions also underscores the nature of this crime as an almost foolproof
allegation for the prosecution. Only two frequently alleged crimes had higher overall conviction
rates, on a count-specific basis: 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 4. AOUSC Database, supra
note 2.
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See text accompanying note 152, supra.
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relatively often―where it almost invariably leads to a conviction.236 These figures
present at least two questions: Why are prosecutors so willing to dismiss these
charges? And why do a relatively large number of these cases go to trial, given
the low odds of acquittal?
The answer to these questions begins with the language of § 924(j), which
provides:
a person who, in the course of a violation of subsection (c) [use of
a firearm in the commission of a federal drug crime or violent
felony], causes the death of a person through the use of a firearm,
shall—(1) if the killing is a murder (as defined in section 1111) be
punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for
life; and (2) if the killing is manslaughter (as defined in section
1112), be punished as provided in that section.
Thus, ―[t]here are four elements that the Government must prove in order to
sustain a violation of § 924(j): 1) the commission of a federal crime of violence or
drug trafficking; 2) the use or carrying of a firearm during or in furtherance of
such a crime; 3) the death of person by the use of the firearm; and 4) the death
was caused by murder [or manslaughter] as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1111 [or
§ 1112].‖237 Significantly, most courts hold that the punishment prescribed by
section 924(j) is cumulative to any sentence imposed for the predicate felony, or
felonies.238
The composition of this crime and its relationship to other offenses go a
long way toward explaining why § 924(j) charges are frequently dismissed
pursuant to plea bargains. Like several other ―charging crimes,‖ § 924(j)
presumes the existence of another serious felony charge, which may be alleged
alongside the § 924(j) count and serve as the basis for the bargain. There are many
such related offenses―from racketeering crimes to drug offenses to the use of
violence against a prospective witness―and these crimes create an array of
possible sentencing ―landing points‖ for plea bargains. In all, cases terminating in
a plea in which a count under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) represented the most serious
initial charge ultimately led to 31 different most serious terminating charges.239
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As evidences by the data in Table VI in Part III, supra. High dismissal rates are
consistent with high trial rates given how few federal criminal cases actually go to trial. As related
earlier in this article, over the studied time period, no commonly charged crime saw trials on more
than 30.1 percent of alleged counts.
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United States v. Winston, 55 Fed. Appx. 289, 300 (6th Cir. 2003).
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At the same time, the gravamen and consequences of a § 924(j) charge,
and the environments in which it operates, encourage trials in cases where the
defendant was closely involved in a homicide―a scenario that ups the stakes for
the prosecution and the defense. In a substantial share of these cases, the § 924(j)
count is the closest thing a federal prosecutor has available to a murder charge
(since there is no general federal jurisdiction for murder). And as previously
discussed,240 prosecutors are loath (relatively speaking) to dismiss murder charges
and inclined to take them to trial. Section 924(j) cases also tend to require
significant investments of time and effort by the prosecution; this commitment of
resources, together with the notoriety that often attaches to these proceedings,
may make prosecutors less interested in plea concessions. 241
From the defense perspective, these cases contain other recurring
attributes that encourage defendants to demand trials. As previously mentioned, a
trial on the § 924(j) count is a given if prosecutors refuse to take the death penalty
off the table.242 In other cases, the presence of several overlapping charges, as
tend to appear in these matters, may mean that a defendant faces so much
potential custody time with or without a plea deal to the § 924(j) count that he will
opt to roll the dice at trial.243 Viewed prospectively, a defendant may not glean
substantial value in a plea offer of 30-year sentence, instead of a 40-year term;
either way, freedom remains decades down the road.244 Perhaps equally
important, these charges often appear in connection with gang or organized crime
activity, as to which special deterrents may exist to the entry of a guilty plea. In
these cases, a defendant may be concerned that his confederates will consider
such a plea as a betrayal, and seek revenge.
240

See text accompanying note 108, supra.
See Margareth Etienne & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Plea Bargaining, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 295, 319 (2007) (observing that ―[t]he psychological effects of . . . sunk costs,
which make it difficult for civil claimants to abandon their efforts, may make it difficult for
victims and prosecutors to do so as well‖).
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While there normally exists no outright bar to such a plea, see Anthony J. Casey,
Maintaining the Integrity of Death: An Argument for Restricting a Defendant’s Right to Volunteer
for Execution at Certain Stages of Capital Proceedings, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 75, 92–93 (2002)
(noting that only Arkansas and New York have outright bans on guilty pleas to a capital crime, as
to which the death penalty may represent a consequence of the plea), ―a case in which a death
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that doing so will avoid the death penalty.‖ James P. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2108 (2000).
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with a § 924(j) count, since they may have represented, the six, seventh, or higher count in some
cases). Of these matters, 263, or 76.2 percent, involved at least five charged counts. AOUSC
Database, supra note 2.
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The data underscore the high stakes that many of these cases involve. In
181 of the 367 cases in the AOUSC Database that included a § 924(j) charge, the
defendant ultimately received a prison sentence of at least 30 years. In the subset
of § 924(j) cases that went to trial and produced a guilty verdict on at least one
count, 90 percent (111 out of 124) led to prison sentences of at least 30 years.
More tellingly, across all tried § 924(j) cases, there was an acquittal rate of only
five percent as to all crimes, not just those under § 924(j). All in all, it appears
that this when this crime goes to trial, the stakes may be so high for the
defendant,245 and the prosecution so reluctant to offer significant concessions, that
trial represents the defense‘s only real strategic option—notwithstanding the low
odds of acquittal.
D. 21 U.S.C. § 952 (Importation of Marijuana)
Another mystery presented by the data concerns the relative rarity of tried
21 U.S.C. § 952 counts that allege the importation of marijuana, as juxtaposed
against the relatively high acquittal rate in these matters. 246 Just 1.2 percent of 21
U.S.C. § 952 counts that allege marijuana importation go to trial.247 These counts
yield an acquittal rate of 37.6 percent (with 118 out of 189 tried counts leading to
convictions), which is almost twice the database average across all counts.248
Particularly given the mandatory minimum sentences that adhere to federal drug
crimes―which suggest that the high plea rate results from something other than
extremely generous sentence offers by prosecutors―this disconnect poses the
question of whether the high acquittal rate results from a particularly potent
selection-bias effect, whereby only especially weak § 952 marijuana cases go to
trial.
The data suggest an affirmative response to this question. First, the data
reveal that these cases tend not to involve much ―charge stacking‖ by the
prosecution. Between FY 2003 and FY 2009, 15,351 cases alleged at least one
marijuana-importation count under 21 U.S.C. § 952 at the time of initial filing.249
Seventy-nine percent of these cases were simple one- or two-count matters.250 In

Elder, supra note 34, at 199 (finding, per a regression analysis, that factors that ―increase
the stakes‖ of a case, such as the use of a weapon in the commission of a crime, or harm or death
to the victim, reduce the likelihood of a plea bargain).
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The AOUSC Database divides marijuana-importation counts among three codes
(21:952=MI.F; 21:952A=MI.F; and 21:952B=MI.F). One of these codes (21:952B=MI.F)
accounted for very few charges; the other two exhibited very similar patterns.
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Id. Across the seven-year period studied, 4,115 section 952 marijuana cases (27%)
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§ 952 cases that alleged only one other count, more than 90 percent of the time,
the second count alleged possession of marijuana with an intent to sell or
distribute (21 U.S.C. § 841) or conspiracy to distribute marijuana (21 U.S.C.
§ 846)—logical charges to join with an importation count, at least when more
than a small amount of marijuana is involved. (When these matters are resolved
by plea, one or another of these two charges is commonly dismissed;251 and in any
event, the two charges may represent ―closely related counts‖ under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, such that the second charge does not threaten significant
additional punishment.252)
Second, most of these cases are simple to prove, and there exist powerful
inducements for a resolution by way of a guilty plea.253 Of the 15,383 cases in
which a section 952 marijuana-importation charge appeared at the time of case
termination, only 5.7 percent did not result in a conviction.254 By way of
comparison, across the AOUSC database as a whole, only 89.5 percent of cases
resulted in convictions.255 Furthermore, due to their concentration within a few
judicial districts (discussed below), these cases tend to be eligible for ―fast track‖
proceedings, which encourage early defense pleas by offering defendants up to a
four-level base offense level reduction.256 The availability of this downward
departure for early pleas contributes to a substantial sentencing differential
between plea-bargained dispositions and dispositions by trial: the median postconviction prison term in § 952 marijuana-importation matters that resolved by
plea was only 15 months,257 but spiked upward in tried cases, to 33 months.258

(14%) alleged four counts, and 412 (3%) alleged five or more counts. AOUSC Database, supra
note 2.
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Id., supra note 2 (reflecting dismissals as to the second count in more than 80 percent of
terminated, two-count 21 U.S.C. § 952 marijuana-importation proceedings).
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See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES §§ 3D1.1, 3D1.2 (2011) (discussing the ―grouping‖ of,
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sentence)
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But cf. Testimony of Steven F. Hubachek and Shereen J. Charlick, Supervisory Attorneys
of Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., before the United States Sentencing Commission
Concerning Fast Track or Early Disposition Programs 6 (Sept. 23, 2003) (on file with author),
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20030923/h
ubachek.pdf (hereinafter ―Hubachek Testimony‖) (discussing triable issues regarding the
defendant‘s knowledge, or lack thereof, that sometimes appear in § 952 cases, and describing the
knowledge element as ―often difficult to demonstrate‖).
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Morford Letter, supra note 231 (reauthorizing ―fast track‖ proceedings for drugimportation cases arising in the Southern District of California, the Western District of Texas, the
District of Arizona, and the Laredo division of the Southern District of Texas). See also Hubachek
Testimony, supra note 253 (discussing the use of fast-track proceedings within the Southern
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Third, and finally, § 952 cases are concentrated within a few jurisdictions.
Between them, the Western District of Texas and the Southern District of
California accounted for more than 85 percent of all terminated § 952 matters
within the aggregate dataset (13,105/15,383).259 Four districts—the two just
mentioned, together with the Southern District of Texas and the District of
Arizona—account for more than 95 percent of these cases (14,664/15,383).260
These conditions—simple cases, recurring charges, low stakes but a trial
penalty for the defense, and concentration of many cases within a few
jurisdictions—suggest that there will be a high percentage of pleas in § 952 cases,
and attorneys who are well positioned to spot the handful of cases in which a
defense may be viable.261 And if one looks at the trial data, it becomes apparent
that the § 952 charges that do go to trial arise in a handful of relatively weak
cases. The acquittal rate for marijuana-importation charges under 21 U.S.C. § 952
is, as stated previously, 37.6 percent.262 Tellingly, the acquittal rate for all other
charges in these cases is not far behind, at 37.4 percent.263 Crimes that normally
yield convictions at trial suddenly become acquittal-prone within this narrow
universe of tried cases. For example, the overall acquittal rate at trial for charges
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), alleging possession of marijuana for sale or
distribution, is 24.8 percent.264 In tried cases that allege a § 952 count, this figure
soars to 34.6 percent.265
The foregoing analysis suggests that the low trial and high acquittal rates
for § 952 marijuana charges likely result from sophisticated case evaluation by
defense attorneys. The attorneys within the handful of jurisdictions that entertain a
large number of § 952 cases see enough of these matters to develop a sense as to
which cases are worth taking to trial. Not many are. Yet a select few do pass this
258
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Guidelines prescribe a 33-month term for possession of at least 40, but less than 60 kilograms of
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test. With this limited universe of cases, many likely involve disputes over the
defendant‘s intent to import the marijuana.266 Under the circumstances, the
defendant is either guilty of importation and possession with the intent to sell or
distribute, or of no crime at all. The prosecution subscribes to the former point of
view, the defense, the latter. Few possible charge bargains exist in these cases,
and barring a sentence bargain (which may be difficult, given mandatory
minimum sentences) these matters will proceed to trial, even if there exists a high
likelihood of acquittal.
E. 26 U.S.C § 7201 (Tax Evasion)
Finally, some offenses may ensnare a relatively high percentage of
defendants who will refuse to enter a plea under almost any circumstances, no
matter how generous the proffered terms are. Some of these defendants may insist
on trials because of something that oversimplified applications of the rationalactor model do not fully account for: principle.
The data that surrounds plea and trial rates for tax crimes suggests that
some defendants in these cases are true believers who will refuse to accept plea
bargains that a ―rational‖ defendant would eagerly embrace. 267 As mentioned at
the outset of this article, charges of felony tax evasion (26 U.S.C. § 7201) go to
trial approximately three times as often as the dataset average (12.2 percent of
these counts are tried, as compared to 4.4 percent for the database as a whole),268
even as the acquittal rate for these charges (13.8 percent) is significantly lower
than the average for all crimes.269 Unlike charges under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j), this
266

E.g., United States v. Ramirez, 176 F.3d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1999) (observing that
―mere knowledge of the presence of contraband, without evidence suggesting a passenger's
dominion or control of the contraband, is insufficient to prove possession,‖ and reversing a
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disparity cannot be explained by reference to any particularly severe
consequences of conviction; sentences for tax evasion are rarely more than a few
years, unless the defendant is a repeat offender or the evaded taxes are massive.270
Some of these trials may occur because, for well-heeled defendants, the
stigma that attaches to any conviction―by plea or by trial―may represent a
particularly large component of the punishment that attaches to the offense.271
Other defendants in tax-evasion cases, meanwhile, may refuse to enter guilty
pleas because they sincerely believe that the federal tax laws are unconstitutional.
This is not a winning argument for them; almost twenty years ago, the United
States Supreme Court held that a considered, fundamental disagreement with the
constitutionality of these laws does not represent a valid defense to a charge of tax
evasion.272 Yet even with this guidance, a sizeable coterie of tax resisters remains
unwilling to concede the point, and demand to take their cases to trial.273 One
exasperated federal judge catalogued some of the ―tired arguments‖274 advanced
by these defendants: ―That the Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was
improperly ratified and therefore never came into being; That wages are not
income and therefore are not subject to federal income tax laws; That tax laws are
unconstitutional; That filing a tax return violates the privilege against self
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; That Federal
Reserve Notes do not constitute cash or income.‖ 275
That defendants continue to press these arguments in court,
notwithstanding their nonexistent odds of success, underscores how many parties
nature of reporting requirement implicated by section 7203‘s felony provision). Somewhat like 18
U.S.C. § 924(j), this crime finds itself being dragged to trial by other crimes charged alongside it.
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simply do not behave as extrapolation from likely trial outcomes might predict.
To these defendants, principle or other inchoate interests may override more
tangible matters, such as custody time, upon which most rational defendants are
supposed to fixate.276 This point is often lost, however, even on the most astute
observers. For example, the passage in the paragraph above, which relates a series
of predictably futile arguments that defendants may prefer over plea deals, was
written by none other than Judge Frank Easterbrook.277
V.

CONCLUSION

The preceding discussion establishes that crime content and the
relationships among criminal offenses can have significant effects upon pleabargaining practices. This awareness offers a better understanding of the factors
that encourage and stymie plea bargains, and sheds additional light on the
limitations and nuances of the rational-actor model.
Data similar to that related above also could produce more thoughtful
evaluations of new and existing crimes, and not just in connection with plea
bargaining.278 Today, the debates over most new crimes could charitably be
described as banal. And once a crime has been enacted, there exists little to no
ongoing consideration of how the offense is being utilized. As this article
demonstrates, there already exists useful information regarding the invocation and
application of specific crimes. One can discern with relative ease how often
prosecutors charge a crime; the circumstances in which it has been charged; the
plea bargains the crime has produced, and the sentences associated with those
deals; the frequency with which a charge goes to trial; and the outcomes in these
trials. In other words, one can tell how—and how well—a crime is working.
This information, appropriately harnessed, would facilitate and enhance
the evaluation of new and existing crimes. For starters, the utilization of
comparable offenses could help legislatures predict how a proposed crime will be
deployed. On this point, consider a different market analogy. When a business
considers whether to launch a new product line, it often will research how similar
products have fared in the past. The business also will consider the costs and
benefits associated with production, including how much the product will cost to
See Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, supra note 63,
at 2554 (observing that in criminal cases, ―the defendant almost always prefers freedom to
incarceration and less incarceration to more‖).
277
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fair, or at least, conventional plea deal would entail. Id. at 1977–78.
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produce and what return it will provide on invested capital. These steps are so
common, and so taken for granted, that one would regard a business that failed to
engage in this sort of benchmarking as likely headed for insolvency.
Legislative consideration of new crimes should be no different. Patterns of
use for comparable existing crimes can help legislatures anticipate how proposed
new offenses will be utilized, with these predictions permitting the improved
appraisal of the costs and benefits associated with the suggested addition to the
criminal code. This proposal is not wholly hypothetical. In 2011, Colorado
enacted a law279 that requires the pre-enactment screening of new crimes. Under
this statute, these crimes are to be accompanied by a fiscal note that includes,
among other information, (a) an analysis of whether the new crime already may
be charged under current law; (b) a comparison of the proposed crime to similar
offenses; and (c) ―an analysis of the current and anticipated future prevalence of
the behavior that the proposed new crime . . . intends to address.‖280 Though this
measure stops short of calling for the comprehensive analysis of the usage of
offenses similar to the new crime, it represents a step in this direction.
Furthermore, we know very little about the utilization of existing
crimes―from 2 U.S.C. § 192 (Congressional contempt) 281 to 50A U.S.C. §
2410(b) (willful violation of war-material export regulations).282 As matters stand,
we lack answers to some very basic questions regarding specific federal criminal
279
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guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and
imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months.‖ 2
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is, any controlled country or any country to which exports are
controlled for foreign policy purposes—(A) except in the case of an
individual, shall be fined not more than five times the value of the
exports involved or $1,000,000, whichever is greater; and (B) in the
case of an individual, shall be fined not more than $250,000, or
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
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laws, such as: Which of the estimated 4,450 federal crimes are actually utilized,
and which are effectively moribund? Which crimes have the highest and lowest
conviction rates? Which crimes tend to be most difficult to prove, when put in
front of judges and juries? What other trends or patterns, if any, emerge when one
examines the invocation of particular crimes across judicial districts, and over
time?
The answers to these questions matter, both to policymakers and
practitioners. Today, assertions that the federal code contains ―too many‖
crimes,283 that prosecutors are coercing plea bargains through improper or
overzealous charging practices,284 and that other aspects of ―overcriminalization‖
are undermining the rule of law 285 tend to rely on anecdotal evidence more than
hard data regarding the utilization of particular offenses. It is therefore
unsurprising that these assertions have failed to produce significant substantive
reforms; even if legislators were inclined to revisit the criminal laws, they rarely
would know precisely which crimes merit their attention. If, on the other hand, it
was generally understood precisely which crimes lie fallow, which crimes seem to
be used to coerce plea bargains, and which crimes are most difficult to prove,
reformers would have a better sense as to where to target their energies.
And so, in the final analysis, this article argues that in at least one
important way crimes should be treated more like widgets, or at least, like
―normal‖ products. Just as corporations engage in market studies prior to product
launch, they also periodically assess whether their existing products have
generated substantial profits. The tendency to lump specific crimes into generic
offense categories such as gun, drug and immigration offenses has made this sort
of analysis difficult. But by appreciating the importance of the specific nature and
utilization of each crime, we may put ourselves in a position to maximize the
returns generated by the criminal law.

―The academic consensus is that federal criminal law . . . includes too many offenses . . .
and covers too many people within the scope of its sanctions. The criminal law of the states has
also been charged with being bloated and rapacious, although there the consensus may be
weaker.‖ Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 149798 (2008)
(footnote omitted).
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